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THIRTY YEARS AFTER WALTERS THE MISSION IS CLEAR,
THE EXECUTION IS MUDDLED:
A FRESH LOOK AT THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION TO
DENY VETERANS THE DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO HIRE
ATTORNEYS IN THE VA BENEFITS PROCESS
Stacey-Rae Simcox *
"Your assumptions are your windows on the world. Scrub them off
every once in a while, or the light won't come in.
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I. INTRODUCTION

"[T]o care for him who shall have borne the battle"-these words
from President Lincoln reverberate throughout history as America's
promise to care for her wounded veterans. 2 Because it is our moral
obligation to care for our veterans, Congress has determined that the
process for them to apply for benefits due to injury in service should
be as informal and easy as possible, with every benefit of the doubt
Indeed, one of the core tenets of the
going to the veteran.
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is that it provides a "veteranfriendly," non-adversarial environment in which the agency helps a
veteran apply for disability benefits.4 Thirty years ago, in the case of
Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors, the Supreme
Court relied on this non-adversarial nature of the VA to limit a
veteran's Fifth Amendment due process rights. The Court held in
Walters that Congress is permitted to statutorily limit a veteran's
ability to hire an attorney during the VA benefits process. 5 The
Supreme Court specifically found that the constitutionally valid
limitation on attorneys is hinged on the coexisting condition that the
VA's system is sufficiently non-adversarial that no attorney should
be necessary. Fifteen years after that decision, Congress codified
historical practices of this non-adversarial system, specifically
enumerating the VA's duties to veterans. 7 In the past thirty years,
Congress has twice altered the limitation on hiring attorneys, but
continues to prohibit veterans from hiring lawyers at certain stages in
1865),
(Mar. 4,
Address
Lincoln, Second Inaugural
2. President Abraham
http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres32.html.
3. Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 329 (1985).
4. Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
5. See Walters, 473 U.S. at 333-34.
6. Id.
7. See Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000).
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the adjudication process. 8 Also in the past thirty years, the Supreme
Court's finding in Walters that the VA is a non-adversarial process
has been relied upon in other
court decisions when determining a
9
veteran's rights and benefits.
Despite the findings of the Court in Walters and the codification of
a non-adversarial benefits system, this Article contends that a court
reviewing the limitation of a veteran's ability to hire an attorney
today should come to the opposite conclusion of the Walters Court.
The circumstances in the veterans benefits system now clearly
demonstrate that the Supreme Court's finding that the VA employs a
veteran-friendly, non-adversarial system is no longer a valid
assumption. For decades, arguments have been made that the VA is
trending away from a system that helps the veteran at every step and
truly gives the veteran the benefit of the doubt. After a review of the
current landscape of veterans benefits, it appears the time has come
to admit that the VA's disability compensation system has become de
facto adversarial at all levels of the adjudication process. The fact
that the VA benefits system is no longer purely non-adversarial
changes the circumstances in which the Walters Court decided that
Congress' limitation on attorneys did not violate veterans' Fifth
Amendment due process rights. l0 It also leads to the conclusion that
due process now demands that veterans rights no longer be limited.
This Article does not intend to argue that Congress should
terminate the veteran-friendly system that it has tried to create for
over a century and move to a purely adversarial system. The term
adversarial is one that should be viewed on a continuum and this
Article does not suggest that the VA is currently or should in the
future engage in a trial process at the VA's adjudication level.
However, the VA has slipped away from a system that deals
reasonably with veterans and adjudicates their claims in a manner
providing veterans the benefit of the doubt.
The veteran
compensation system should continue to strive for a system that
honors veterans for their service and gives veterans the benefit of the
doubt, but the reality is that the VA alone cannot ensure this
8. See 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(2) (2012).
9. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 431 (2011) (quoting Walters, 473 U.S. at 311)
("The VA's adjudicatory process is designed to function throughout with a high degree of informality
and solicitude for the claimant."); Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013, 1036 (9th
Cir. 2012) (citing Walters, 473 U.S. at 323-24) ("We emphasize, as the district court did, that Congress
purposefully designed a non-adversarial system of benefits administration .... This is particularly true
as it pertains to the retention of counsel during the initial claim phase, which the Supreme Court found
would seriously frustrate the oft-repeated congressional purpose to maintain the non-adversarial bent of
benefits administration.").
10. Walters, 473 U.S. at 323.
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environment. Veterans are entitled to our best efforts to administer
their benefits to them in as veteran-friendly and non-adversarial a
manner as we can. Thus, by denying veterans certain safeguards that
the VA cannot provide, we are doing our veterans a disservice and
violating their Constitutional rights. Guaranteeing that veterans have
access to all manner of advocates at all levels of the process will
ensure that the veteran-friendly procedures are being properly
implemented at the lowest levels of the VA. Proper adjudication at
the lowest levels will eliminate needless appeals that clog up the
system and cause veterans to wait years for new decisions.
Part II of this Article will discuss the historical beginnings of the
VA's mission and the current process for a veteran to receive benefits
from the VA. Part III will consider the historical underpinnings of
the VA's non-adversarial system and review the history of attorney
representatives in the VA process. It will also discuss the Supreme
Court decision in Walters and the changes in the law that brought
judicial review to VA decisions and codified the VA's duties to a
veteran. Part IV will analyze the current state of the non-adversarial
system of the VA and the problems the VA has recently had in
implementing a non-adversarial, veteran-friendly system. Part V will
propose that the current state of affairs at the VA requires a new
evaluation of a veteran's due process right to an attorney under the
Mathews test. It will also propose that the best way to preserve the
veteran-friendly nature of the VA's system is to allow attorneys to
help veterans in this process and alleviate the burden on the VA.
II.

THE PURPOSE OF THE

VA

A. HistoricalBeginnings of the VA
To understand why the VA is ordered by Congress to be a nonadversarial, "veteran friendly" system requires an appreciation of the
long history of the VA and veterans in the United States. While the
entire historical relationship of America with her veterans is an
interesting story, 1 for purposes of this Article the analysis of the
"non-adversarial" character of the VA begins at the conclusion of
America's Civil War.
11. For more information on this historical relationship, see Dennis Whelan, William Henry
Glasson and the First Hundred Years of Federal Compensationfor Service Connected Disability in
2013),
31,
Aug.
Paper,
(Working
(2013)
45-46
America
James D. Ridgway, The Splendid
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2344337;
Isolation Revisited: Lessons from the History of Veterans'Benefits Before JudicialReview, 3 VETERANS
L. REv. 135, 135-39, 154-57 (2011).
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Toward the end of the Civil War, the United States was in
disarray. 12 President Lincoln in his second inaugural address, just
weeks before his own death, reminded Americans that, despite the
pain and suffering they had been through, there was a purpose in the
misery and the American people could persevere. 13 The President
urged that, while Americans should pray for a swift end to the war,
the end would come in God's time at His will. 14 In light of the fact
that President Lincoln believed the end of the war would not be
brought about by man's actions, the President charged Americans
with the only duty they could carry out ,in the face of this reality:
With malice toward none, with charity for all, with
firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right,
let us strive on to finish the work we are in, to bind up
the nation's wounds, to care for him who shall have
borne the battle and for his widow and his orphan, to
do all which may achieve and cherish a just and
15
lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.
This passionate prayer for Americans to work together to "bind up
the nation's wounds" and to care for her servicemen was made in
America's darkest hour. 16
Tensions and emotions were
understandably high and a call for renewed patriotism was necessary
to reform the country's two distinct parts as one. 17 To rally America
around her wounded military veterans was the best and most noncontentious cause to heal the nation's divisions.1 8
In
acknowledgement of the charge laid at the feet of the nation, the
phrase "to care for him who shall have borne the battle and for his
widow and orphan" was adopted by the emerging arm of the Pension
Bureau, the precursor to the VA.19
It would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of the
patriotism and sense of moral obligation invoked by President
Lincoln and echoed throughout America's history.2 0
Many
12. See generally Paul F. Paskoff, Measures of War: A QuantitativeExamination of the Civil
War's Destructiveness in the Confederacy, in 54 CIVIL WAR HISTORY 35 (2008).
13. See Lincoln, supranote 2.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. President Abraham
Lincoln, Second Inaugural
Address (Mar. 4,
1865),
http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres32.html.
17. The Origin of the VA Motto: Lincoln 's Second InauguralAddress, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS
AFF., http://www.va.gov/opa/publications/celebrate/vamotto.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2016) [hereinafter
The Origin of the VA Motto].
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. WILLIAM H. GLASSON, FEDERAL MILITARY PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 207-08

(1918).

For instance, twenty years after President Lincoln's words, President Grover Cleveland
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Americans, and indeed Congress throughout the decades, believe this
calling created a moral and ethical obligation on behalf of America to
care for the wounded military veterans sent into her service.
America's government, through most of its history, has not treated
the words "to care for him who shall have borne the battle" as merely
it
a slogan-this promise and the moral obligations that flow from 21
are at the heart of the VA's historically non-adversarial system.
President Lincoln's promise still influences modem political and
policy decisions concerning the administration of the veterans
benefits system. The Veterans Disability Benefits Commission,
tasked in 2007 to propose suggestions to battle inefficiencies and
errors in the VA system, remarked:
The Commission wrestled with philosophical and
moral questions about how a Nation cares for disabled
veterans and their survivors and how it expresses its
gratitude for their sacrifices. The Commission agreed
that the United States has a solemn obligation,
expressed so eloquently by President Lincoln, ".

.

. to

care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for
his widow, and his orphan...

,22

It is this moral obligation to our veterans upon which the entire
veterans disability compensation process is built.
B. The Organization of the VA and the DisabilityCompensation System

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is a department of the
United States Government with a cabinet-level secretary who
answers directly to the President. 23 The VA itself has three distinct
parts: the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), the Veterans
(VHA), and the National Cemetery
Health Administration
24
Administration.

remarked on our country's obligation to care for our veterans that "I cannot rid myself of the conviction
that if these ex-soldiers are to be relieved, they and their cause are entitled to the benefit ... and that
such relief should be granted under the sanction of law, not in evasion of it; nor should such worthy
objects of care, all equally entitled, be remitted to the unequal operation of sympathy, or the tender
mercies of social and political influence with their unjust discriminations."
21. See The Origin of the VA Motto, supra note 17.
22. Findingof the Veterans' Disability Benefits Commission: HearingBefore the H. Comm. On
Veterans' Affairs, 110th Cong. 38 (2007) (statement of Lieutenant General James Terry Scott, USA
(Ret.) Chairman, Veterans' Disability Benefits Commission: Executive Summary).
23. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Aff., Off. of Pub. & Intergovernmental Aff., VA
1999),
(Mar.
15,
Department
a
Cabinet
as
Anniversary
Observes
10th
http://wwwl .va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=145.
24. Dept. of Veterans Affairs OrganizationalChart, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF. (June 2009),
http://www.va.gov/ofcadmin/docs/vaorgchart.pdf.
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The VBA is responsible for determining and administering
veterans' benefits.25 These benefits include pensions, education
funds, disability compensation, guaranteed home loans, and more.26
This Article focuses exclusively on disability compensation benefits
The lowest level (agency of original
and their adjudication.
jurisdiction) of the VBA is the Regional Office, or VARO.2 7 The
VARO has employees known as "Rating Veterans Service
Representatives" (RVSRs) who decide a veteran's claim for
benefits. 28 These RVSRs are not normally lawyers or doctors. 229 The
RVSR employee is usually a lower level federal employee who has
VBA employees with more
been on the job less than five years.
experience, referred to as Decision Review Officers (DROs), are
upon request of the veteran after
often assigned to review claims
31
appealing an initial decision.
Veterans who have been wounded or suffered some other
disability in service to the nation may file a claim for disability
benefits with the VA. 32 These disability compensation benefits
normall come to veterans in the form of a non-taxable monthly
check.3 To be eligible for any VA benefits, the veteran must first
prove that he 34 is indeed a veteran with a discharge that is "other than
25. About VBA, Veterans Benefits Administration, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF.,
http://www.benefits.va.gov/benefits/about.asp (last visited June 27, 2015).
26. See id.
27. See Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2000); How to Apply, Compensation,
U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., http://www.benefits.va.gov/compensation/apply.asp (last visited June
27, 2015).
28. See Rating Veterans Service Representative, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF.,
http://mycareeratva.va.gov/careers/career/099604 (last visited June 27, 2015).
29. See id.
30. See Adjudicating VA 's Most Complex Disability Claims. Ensuring Quality, Accuracy and
Consistency on Complicated Issues: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Disability Assistance and
Memorial Affairs of the Comm. On Veterans' Affairs, 113th Cong. 44 (2013) (statement of Zach Hearn,
Deputy Director for Claims of the American Legion); see also Addressing the Backlog: Can the US.
Department of Veterans Affairs Manage One Million Claims?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On
DisabilityAssistance and Memorial Affairs of the Comm. On Veterans 'Affairs, 11 1th Cong. 52 (2009)
(statement of Ian de Planque, Assistant Director of Veterans Affairs and Rehabilitation Commission for
the American Legion).
31. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.2600 (2014); see U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., M21-1, ADJUDICATION
PROCEDURE MANUAL, PT. I, CH. 5, § C(2)(a) (2015).
32. See 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a) (2003); 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2012).
33. See Veterans CompensationBenefits Rate Tables, Compensation, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS
AFF., http://www.benefits.va.gov/COMPENSATION/resources-comp0l.asp (last visited Aug. 17,
2016); 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a) (2003).
34. The pronoun "he" will be used throughout this Article to refer to the veteran. This is not to
discount the service of our women in uniform. However, because men make approximately ninety-one
percent of living veterans and for the purposes of simplicity, the pronoun "he" will be used. See NAT'L
CTR. FOR VETERANS ANALYSIS & STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., VETERAN POPULATION,
http://www.va.gov/vetdata/veteranpopulation.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
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dishonorable." 35 After this step has been met, the veteran may prove
entitlement to disability compensation if he can show that he meets a
three-pronged test: (1) he suffers from a current disability; (2) an
event that occurred during his or her active service caused that
disability; (3) and that the two are causally connected, often referred
to as the "nexus." 36 Proving a causal connection often requires
medical evidence in the form of an opinion from a qualified medical
professional.37
The standard of proof a veteran must meet to connect these
disabilities to his or her service is "as likely as not." 38 In general, the
standard provides that "a veteran need only demonstrate that there is
'an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence' in order
to prevail... [i]n other words.., the preponderance of the evidence
must be against the claim for benefits to be denied., 39 In the eyes of
the law, this standard of proof is not terribly burdensome and is less
than even the civil litigation "preponderance of the evidence"
standard. This benefit of the doubt requirement is one of the aspects
of the veterans benefits system
that has earned the system its non40
adversarial characterization.
In addition to a low standard of proof, the VA is statutori
required to assist the veteran through the process of filing a claim.
These requirements are often referred to as the VA's duties. 42 These
duties will be discussed in more detail further in this Article. It is
enough to say here that the VA is required to help a veteran find
evidence to support his claims, provide medical examinations in most
instances, and 43 otherwise treat the claims of a veteran
sympathetically.
To begin the disability compensation process, the veteran must file
a claim with the nearest VARO.4 4 The claims process at the VARO
35. 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2008); 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(d) (2014). The requirements for veteran status
could fill an article length analysis themselves. This Article assumes the veterans discussed herein have
met these threshold requirements and are indeed eligible veterans.
36. Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (Vet. App. 1995), afid,78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
37. See id An exception to the need for medical evidence occurs in cases where lay testimony is
sufficient to satisfy these requirements, such as cases where a layperson could make an obvious medical
diagnosis. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
38. See Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1Vet. App. 49, 54 (Ct. Vet. App. 1990); 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (2000);
38 C.F.R. § 3.102 (2013).
39. Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 54.
40. Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
41. See 38 U.S.C. § 5103A (2012).
42. See id.
43. See id. §§ 5103A, 5107, 5109; see also McGee v. Peake, 511 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2008); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1338 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
44. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 5107, 5110(a). While this is a codified requirement, the VBA has recently
altered this requirement by creating two processing centers for claims across the United States, one in

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol84/iss3/3

8

Simcox: Thirty Years After Walters the Mission Is Clear, The Execution Is

2016]

VETERANS' DUE PROCESS AND VA BENEFITS

is considered non-adversarial, discussed in more detail below.45
Since March 2015, veterans are required to use a specific form to
give the VA information concerning the disability for which he or
she is claiming benefits.46 After the veteran files a claim, the VA
will interpret the veteran's claim and begin collecting evidence
regarding the claim. This step in the process is crucial because the
beginning of fact investigation is done at this stage in the process.
After investigation, the RVSR will adjudicate the veteran's claim and
issue a decision, formally referred to as a "rating decision., 47 This
rating decision will tell the veteran the evidence considered, the legal
theory of connection under which the disability was viewed, 48 and
the decision of the VA. If the veteran is not satisfied with the rating
decision, the veteran has one year to file an appeal referred to as the
"Notice of Disagreement" (NOD).4 9 When a veteran files a NOD,
the VARO is required to issue a "statement of the case" (SOC) to the
veteran explaining in more detail why that particular decision was
made on the veteran's claim. 50 The veteran then must file a VA
Form 9 to begin his substantive appeal to the next appellate level, the
Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA or Board). 51 The Board is a part
of the VA and is bound by the VA Secretary's rules and regulations
and the le~al advice and determinations of the VA Office of General
The Board is staffed with attorneys and Veterans Law
Counsel.
53
Judges who review and render decisions on the claims.
Proceedings before the Board are also considered non-adversarial.54
There is no representative of the VA advocating against the veteran
at these hearings. 55 However, the Veterans Law Judges deciding a
veteran's claim are employees of the VA.56 Veterans may hire
Georgia and one in Wisconsin. The VBA now requests that all claims be sent to one of these two
offices. See also Mailing Addresses for Disability Compensation Claims, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS
AFF., http://www.benefits.va.gov/compensation/mailingaddresses.asp (last visited Aug. 16, 2016).
45. See Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 323-24 (1985).
46. See Department of Veteran Affairs Standard Claim and Appeals Forms, 79 Fed. Reg. 57,695
(Sept. 25, 2014) (codified at 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a) (2014)).
47. 38 U.S.C. § 7104 (a)-(b) (2012).
48. Legal theories of connection include a direct service connection, a secondary-service
connection, and presumptive service connection among others. See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303-.318 (1961).
49. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1).
50. 38 C.F.R. § 19.26 (2016). Similar to the claims filing process, the VBA now requires
veterans to send NODs to one of the two central processing centers in Georgia or Wisconsin. However,
this process is not codified or implemented by rule.
51. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105 (2012).
52. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(c).
53. See 38 U.S.C. § 7101(a); see Gateway to VA Appeals, Bd. of Veterans'Appeals, U.S. DEP'T
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.bva.va.gov (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
54. Jaquay v. Principi, 304 F.3d 1276, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
55. 38 C.F.R. § 20.700(c) (1996).
56. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7101, 7101A(a).
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attorneys to represent them at this stage of the proceedings.57
If a veteran is not happy with the decision of the Board, the veteran
may appeal to the first level of federal court alellate review, the
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC).
The CAVC was
created in 1988 and is an Article I appellate court. 59 Before the
creation of the CAVC (or Court of Veterans Appeals as it was
originally known) there was no real possibility of appellate review of
Board decisions. 0 The CAVC is authorized to have seven full-time
judges who are appointed by the President and serve for terms of
fifteen years each.51 Proceedings at the CAVC are considered to be
adversarial, and the VA's interests are represented by attorneys from
the VA's own Office of General Counsel who argue the VA's
position.62 Obviously, this is a notable departure from the system the
veteran experienced prior to this level of proceedings. 63 Veterans or
the VA may appeal decisions of the CAVC to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit. 64 The Federal Circuit only has jurisdiction to
hear appeals that involve "the validity of any statute or regulation or
any interpretation thereof

. . .

and to interpret constitutional and

statutory provisions. ' 65 From the Federal Circuit, a veteran may
attempt to seek review from the Supreme Court of the United
States.66
Veterans may seek representation during the claims process or can
pursue their claims pro se.67 There are two types of veterans
advocates in the VA system, non-attorney and attorney. The
Veterans Service Organizations (VSOs) provide non-attorney
representatives at no cost to the veteran to help them through the VA
system and may also help at the CAVC. VSOs are approved by
Congress and have a special status with the VA, including an
allotment of space in VA facilities where VSOs can meet with
veterans. 68 VSOs can represent a veteran at any point in the

57. See id. §§ 5904(c), 7105.
58. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (1998).
59. See Veterans' Admin. Adjudication Procedure and Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988); see 38 U.S.C. § 7251.
60. See Veterans' Admin. Adjudication Procedure and Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988).
61. 38 U.S.C. § 7253(a)-(c) (2008).
62. 38 U.S.C. § 7263(a) (1998); see Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
63. See 38 U.S.C. § 7263; see Forshey, 284 F.3d at 1355.
64. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c) (2002).
65. Id.
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988).
67. See generally Moody v. Principi, 360 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (treating as pro se a veteran
represented by a veterans service organization); Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(same). See also 38 C.F.R. § 14.628(d)(2) (2016).
68. 38 C.F.R. § 14.628 (2016); see also Veterans Service Organizations, HOUSE COMM. ON
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administrative process.
While attorneys may help veterans pro bono at all levels of the
process, veterans are prohibited by statute from hiring an attorney to
pursue their claims until after the VARO has made a decision and the
veteran has affirmatively appealed that decision by filing a NOD. 0
Attorneys who help veterans pursue benefits from the VA must be
accredited annually by the VA and receive special training in the
71
form of continuing legal education every
Attorneys'
72 two years.
fees.
"reasonable
at
fees are also capped
III.

THE NON-ADVERSARIAL AND PATERNALISTIC NATURE OF THE VA

A. The HistoricalUnderpinningsofPaternalismat the VA:
Politics,Money, and Attorneys

It is impossible to discuss the evolution of the veteran-friendly,
non-adversarial character of the VA without discussing the history of
attorneys and other paid agents in the VA system. Were it not for
this group of advocates, Congress' expansion of paternalistic
protection of veterans would likely not be so pervasive and cemented
into the foundation of the VA benefits process.
Again, the most appropriate place to begin this discussion is the
end of the Civil War. After this war, Americans did take the call to
care for veterans seriously. 73 However, by 1866 veterans were yet
another constituency that politicians desired to court and the manner
of doing so was through veterans' benefits.74 In his treatise of 1918,
one eminent historian in the area of military pension benefits, Dr.
William Glasson, presented numerous examples of concerns that the
pension system of the time was being held hostage by potentially

VETERANS' AFFAIRS, http://veterans.house.gov/citizens/resources (last visited Nov. 17, 2014); 38
C.F.R. § 14.628 (2003); see generally The Role of National,State, and County Veterans Service Officers
in Claims Development: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and Memorial
Affairs of the Comm. on Veterans 'Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006).
69. See generally The Role of National, State, and County Veterans Service Officers in Claims
Development, supranote 71.
70. 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(2) (2006).
71. See 38 C.F.R. § 14.629(a); VSOs are defined by the VA as "non-profit groups [which]
advocate on behalf of [v]eterans." These groups are normally made up of a large number of volunteer
veterans and some paid staff. Glossary, NAT'L CTR FOR VETERANS ANALYSIS & STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.va.gov/vetdata/glossary.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2014); see
generally The Role of National, State, and County Veterans Service Officers in Claims Development,
supra note 71.
72. 38 U.S.C. § 5904(a)(5) (2006); 38 C.F.R. § 14.637(d) (2015).
73. See Whelan, supranote 11, at 45-46; see Ridgway, supranote 11, at 154-57.
74. See Ridgway, supranote 11, at 155.
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fraudulent claims perpetuated by claims agents and attorneys looking
to make a fast dollar helping veterans file claims, regardless of their
validity. 75 The Commissioner of Pensions, in charge of the Pension
Bureau-the federal government office charged with administering
these payments-complained to Congress that attorneys' false
advertising to veterans and political pressure on politicians for more
veteran benefits was exacerbating the problem of an already difficultto-manage system. 76 It appears that Congress was also convinced
that agents and attorneys pushing for pro-veteran compensation
legislation were not to be relied upon as trustworthy actors.
To claim that Congress had a disdain for attorneys in the 1860s to
1890s is an understatement. In one debate on the passage of a widow
pension in 1886, Senator Edward Bragg of Wisconsin invoked the
specter of attorney machinations for generating fees for new
applications as being the impetus for the legislation. Senator Bragg
referred to these 7 9fees as "blood taken from the soldiers whom they

pretend to love."

Why, Mr. Speaker, these (attorneys) that pretend to be
"friends of soldiers" are the friends of soldiers as
vultures are the friends of dead bodies-because they
feed and fatten them. [Applause.] . . .They file the

application; they draw their $10; they give notice then
that the papers are complete and that the applicant
need only send them to his member of Congress and
his case will be attended to promptly. Those are the
men who are the professed "friends of soldiers." They
have the80voice of Jacob, but their hand has the clutch
of Esau.
In 1862, in response to early complaints from the head of the
Pension Bureau concerning attorney misconduct, Congress passed
the first legislation limiting the amount of an attorney's fee to a $5
limit that only extended to the initial application of the veteran. 81 A
year and a half later, in 1864, the fee limit was raised to $10.82
Complaints about the veterans compensation system were not
limited to protesting attorney involvement. Throughout the late
1800s, claims agents and attorneys were also accusing the Pension
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See GLASSON, supra note 20, at 157-58.
See id. at 149-50.
See id. at 158-59.
Id.
Id.at214.
Id.
See Whelan, supra note 11, at 46.
See id. at 48, 50.
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Bureau of ineffectually administering the pension system and
allowing the process to be marked by "arbitrary rulings and
unnecessary delays in the adjudication of pension claims." 83 There
were also charges that the Pension Bureau itself was corrupt and
being used as a political tool to gain votes in some districts. 84 During
a Congressional investigation in 1880, a "whistleblower" from the
Bureau testified that the Commissioner refrained from paying out
pensions during a time when the Secretary of the Treasury was
concerned about the appearance of the government's financial report
during an election year.
The moral obligation to veterans began to be diluted by concerns
over money and political wrangling. 86 Politicians wanted to buy the
loyalty of veterans, but did not want to be seen as bankrupting the
nation to do so. 87 Attorneys cashing in on the process of helping
veterans and receiving some of the benefit payment looked unseemly
in the eyes of the Congress, which was already being hounded to
balance taking care of veterans with the United States treasury
deficit. 88 Attorneys were also encouraging veterans, for better or
worse, to apply for pensions the veterans may not have otherwise
considered seeking.
Scorn was heaped upon these attorneys for
advertising the benefits due to veterans from the legislation that
Congress was passing in order to continue to secure the veteran
voting bloc. 90 Additionally, contempt of those who advocated more
benefits for veterans, and likely made some money from the
applications for the benefits, diverted attention from the fact that
Congress is the body that ultimately decided to pass these bills with
their enormous price tags. 91 Veterans for their part were a divided
group. 92 Many veterans held the position that they never wanted to
become pensioners and did not begrudge those who must, but did
despise those who unjustly sucked money from the government's

83. GLASSON, supranote 20, at 179.
84. See id. at 179-80, 199 (Commissioner of Pensions Black, in his 1885 congressional report,
noted that the Pension Bureau had become "all but avowedly a political machine ....
85. See id. at 179-80.
86. See id. at 192-95.
87. See id. at 194 (Senator Saulsbury stated that "the soldiers have votes and we are all human
beings and controlled somewhat by motives of self-interest . . . but behind us there is another power
greater than ourselves controlling our action if not our judgment... the Senators of the United States,
great and mighty as they may be, bow to the behests of the pension agents and vote the money that they
require ....
")
88. See GLASSON, supranote 20, at 192-95.
89. See id.
at 185-187.
90. See id.
at 159-160.
91. See id. at 184-85.
92. See id.
at 184.
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coffers. 93 However, other veterans were encouraged to apply for
benefits because the nation could never be too grateful to its soldiers
who saved the Republic.94 According to Glasson, those veterans with
"honorable protests against extravagance and fraud in the pension
system were too often without avail in the face of the
95 clamor of the
organized claimants and the wiles of their attorneys."
Meanwhile, the public truly did support the call to "care for him
who shall have borne the battle" 96 while the nation's treasury was
flush with cash in the late 1800s. During this time, very little
grumbling from the public was heard over these expenditures. This
generosity is remarkable considering that by the late 1800s veterans
who had any injury, no matter how or when it was caused, were
entitled to some disability benefit and the American taxpayer was
footing the bill. 98 In 1890, this bill "exceeded the entire German
military budget." 99 As time went on however, even the American
public became tired of paying exorbitant amounts for military
veterans benefits. Attorneys and claims agents were
100 viewed as being
at least partially responsible for this predicament.
By the end of World War I, Congress was still operating under the
shadow cast by dealings with attorneys and claims agents of the Civil
War era.101 Congressional debate on a war-risk insurance bill
designed to pay the survivors of servicemen killed in action is
enlightening in this regard. 10 2 The war-risk insurance bill was put up
for amendment in 1918 particularly to regulate attorney involvement
in the administration of the benefit. The bill as proposed would
prevent attorneys from doing little more than filing claim paperwork
for the beneficiary.1 0 3 In arguing for a limitation of attorneys in this
process, one Congressman went to great lengths to describe the
manner in which attorneys advertised their services to potential
beneficiaries:
During the period when casualty lists were published
and the names of the next of kin of those injured or
killed in the service were printed with the address,

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See GLASSON, supranote 20, at 184.
See id. at 185.
Id. at 185-86.
See id. at 265.
See id. at 212, 265-66.
See Ridgway, supra note 11, at 166.
Id.
See id.
at 158-59.
65 Cong. Rec. 1, 5221 (1918).
See id.
See id.
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these so-called claims agents took those addresses and
at once communicated with the beneficiaries under the
law . . . (The Congressman refers to a letter in his

hand written by an attorney to the mother of one of the
fallen soldiers) This is the sentence to which I desire
to call the particular attention of the House: "Of
course, you understand that in a claim of any sort
against the Government, no officer or agent of the
Government can render the claimant the aid and
counsel an attorney can"-and so forth. In other
words, the claim-agent concern here says that it can do
better service for the beneficiaries under the war-risk
insurance act than can any officer or agent of the
Government.
Was there ever a more deceiving
communication? 104
One Congressman brought up a common concern asking,
"Suppose the claimant is tired out by departmental delay. He goes to
an attorney and seeks redress. The attorney is absolutely prohibited
from negotiating with him for any fee?" 10 5 In response, one of the
supporters of the bill retorted that "the case will be entirely taken care
of by the Government, and there will be no reason for an attorney at
all, because the Government will investigate the question and it will
be decided without the need for an attorney."' 10 6 This premise that
attorneys were unnecessary and unhelpful because the government
itself would help the veteran through the process remained basically
unchanged until 1988.
B. Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors
It was with this attitude concerning attorneys and government
assistance in the compensation process that was cemented in place
when the Supreme Court heard a constitutional challenge to the
attorney fee limitation of $10 in 1985.107

The case, Walters v.

National Association of Radiation Survivors, was brought on behalf
of veterans and survivors who claimed that the fee limitation violated
their due process rights bylpreventing them from being able to hire
the attorney of their choice. 8
To determine what due process was owed to the Walters veterans,
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See id.
See id.
65 Cong. Rec. at 5221.
See Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
Id. at 307-08.
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the Court used the familiar balancing test found in Mathews v.
Eldridgerequiring them to weigh:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail. 109
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, delivered a scathing
rebuke of the district court's finding that the limitation on hiring an
attorney was unconstitutional and a violation of the Fifth and First
Amendments. The Court took the most issue with the district court's
weighing of the second and third prongs of the Mathews test. 110 The
district court found that, due to the complexity of the VA system, it
was more likely that a veteran may not be aware of their rights or
may fail to engage in factual and evidentiary development without
attorney representation.111 The district court also pointed to the VA's
lack of resources to spend time on developing a veteran's case and
the inability of the VSOs and VA to provide all of the services that an
attorney might to demonstrate that the safeguards in place were not
terribly valuable. 112 The district court cited to complex cases that
required significant development as an example of claims that were
inadequately treated under this system.113 As to the governmental
interest in maintaining the limitation on attorneys, the district court
found that the government failed to demonstrate any harm that may
come from lifting the ban, which was in place only because of the
government's paternalistic desire to save veterans from supposed
unscrupulous attorneys. 114
In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court disagreed entirely
with the lower court and reversed the decision.1 15 For purposes of
this Article, it is instructive to look at the Court's opinion and
understand the assumptions the Court made about the VA system
when deciding that due process did not require the right to an
attorney. The Court, in reviewing the governmental interest, did not
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 313 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
Id.at 321-23.
Id.
Walters, 473 U.S. at 314.
Seeid. at314.
See id. at 315.
Id. at 335.
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disagree that the government's desire to protect veterans led to
Congress' creation of the fee limitation.1 16 The Court also asserted
that it was the assumption of Congress and the Court that attorney
integration would take away the non-adversarial nature of the VA
process. 117 Indeed, the Court pointed to the fact that the law had
been in effect, in more or less the same form, for 120 years as a
reason why even more deference than usual should be given to the
prohibition. 118 The Court made very clear that in this matter "[a]
necessary concomitant of Congress' desire that a veteran not need a
representative to assist him in making his claim was that the system
should be as informal and non-adversarial as possible." 119 The Court
noted that it was not possible to tell from the record how many
claimants' matters were wrongly decided at the VARO or BVA
levels because at the time of the Court's decision no further review of
claims was possible. 12 Thus it was impossible to determine if any
1
erroneous deprivation of property interests was occurring at all. 1
The Court held that there was no evidence that the VA's system was
"procedurally, factually, or legally complex" or that the VA system
does not work as designed.
Thus, there was no evidence of
erroneous deprivation of property rights, and the procedures in place
appeared to safeguard against any possible deprivation.12 3 Finally,
the Court found that the vast majority of the disability claims in the
system involve simple questions of fact or medicine which are
readily handled by the system in place. 124 The Court found
specifically that "[t]here are undoubtedly 'complex' cases pending
before the VA, 1and
they are undoubtedly a tiny fraction of the total
25
cases pending."'

The Court noted that while due process in some types of cases may
permit a petitioner to hire an attorney, the VA's non-adversarial
process marginalizes the importance of those cases when considering
26
a veteran's due process rights to hire an attorney. 1
[W]here, as here, no such adversary appears, and in
addition a claimant or recipient is provided with
116. See id. at 321.
117. See Walters, 473 U.S. at 323-24.
118. Seeid. at 319-20.
119. Walters, 473 U.S. at 323.
120. Court oversight of BVA decisions was not permitted until the Veterans Judicial Review Act
of 1988, 38 U.S.C. §§ 4051-4091 (1988).
121. See Walters, 473 U.S. at 327.
122. See id at 328-29.
123. See id.
124. Id.at 329-30.
125. Id. at 330.
126. See Walters, 473 U.S. at 332.
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substitute safeguards such as a competent
representative, a decisionmaker whose duty it is to aid
the claimant, and significant concessions with respect
to the claimant's burden of lroof, the need for counsel
is considerably diminished.
The members of the Court who joined in the majority opinion took
seriously the VA's assertion that the process regarding veterans
compensation is non-adversarial. As an indication of this, the
concurrence written by Justice O'Connor notes that the nonadversarial process and the ability of veterans to have non-attorney
representation render the limitation of a veteran's ability to hire an
attorney not "per se unconstitutional." 128 However, she goes on to
say that in cases where it appears that the non-adversarial process
was not employed, courts can and should review the limitation of a
129
veteran's due process rights in light of that failure.
The dissent, written by Justice Stevens, relied on the concept of
individual liberty as the purpose for finding the limitation on
attorneys unconstitutional. 1 ° While Justice Stevens recognized the
government interest in maintaining an informal and non-adversarial
environment, he noted that there did not appear to be any rational
reason that attorneys could not participate in such an environment:
But there is no reason to assume that lawyers would
add confusion rather than clarity to the proceedings.
As a profession, lawyers are skilled communicators
dedicated to the service of their clients. Only if it is
assumed that the average lawyer is incompetent or
unscrupulous can one rationally conclude that the
efficiency of the agency's work would be undermined
by allowing counsel to participate whenever a veteran
is willing to pay for his31services. I categorically reject
any such assumption. 1
In this case, Justice Stevens believed that the age of the statute cut
against it because the assumptions about unscrupulous attorneys
made in the past are no longer true.132 Justice Stevens noted that
veterans who do not want or need to hire an attorney for very simple
claims have a well-trained cadre of VSO service officers to rely on
for help in prosecuting their claims, so no veteran will be forced to
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 333-34.
See id. at 338.
Id.
at 358.
See id.
Walters, 473 U.S. at 363.
See id. at 362.
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hire a lawyer. 133 Based upon these considerations, "the kind of
paternalism reflected in this statute as it operates today is irrational.
It purports to protect the veteran who has little or no need for
protection, and it actually denies him assistance in cases
'1 34 in which the
help of his own lawyer may be of critical importance."
When addressing the majority's finding that the constitutional
requirement for due process is satisfied by the VA because there is no
proof that there is a high probability of error in the system, Justice
Stevens sums it up this way: "In short, if 80 or 90 percent of the cases
are correctly decided, why worry about those individuals whose
claims have been erroneously rejected and who might have prevailed
if they had been represented by counsel?" 135 The dissent asserted
that just because all veterans may not need an attorney to help them
does not mean that those who do should be denied this right to
representation. 136
C. The Non-AdversarialSystem Today
Three years after the Supreme Court's ruling in Walters, the issue
of attorneys in the non-adversarial system was turned upside down
when President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Veterans Judicial
Review Act (VJRA) in 1988.1 37 The passage of the VJRA
represented a substantial shift in the attitudes of Congress towards
attorneys in the veterans benefits process. It also saw Congress and
modem Veterans Service Organizations (VSOs) locking horns over
the issue of injecting attorneys (judges or otherwise) into the process.
VSOs presented themselves to Congress as the alternative to judicial
review, with the VSO legislative arms offering a "check and balance"
to the VA system in what was presented to Congress as the VSO's
"quasi-governmental" role. 138 The VA itself also bucked the
constraints of judicial review. The Vietnam Veterans of America
accused the VA of threatening to take away the free space and
telephone service VSOs were offered if judicial review was
enacted. 139 The VA and others offered many reasons to justify
133. See id. at 366.
134. Id.at 367.
135. Id. at 368.
136. Walters, 473 U.S. at 368-70.
137. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4051-4092 (1988).
138. See S. 11, The Proposed Veterans' Administration Adjudication Procedure and Judicial
Review Act, and S. 2292, Veterans' Judicial Review Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Veterans'
Affairs, 100th Cong. 279-80 (1988) (statement of John F. Heilman, Nat'l Legislative Dir., Disabled
American Veterans).
139. See id at 218 (statements of Richard E. O'Dell, Vice President and Chairman of Comm. on
Advocacy, Vietnam Veterans of Am., and Paul S. Egan, Legislative Dir., Vietnam Veterans of Am.).
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denying veterans judicial review in the disability compensation
process to include increased costs to the VA; 140 the fear that the
entire veterans benefits process would move to an adversarial
system; 141 and a fear of attorneys bilking veterans out of their earned
While
benefits which was rooted in the post-Civil War era. 14
acknowledging that some "suggest that the current system is
adversarial and rigid," the American Legion adamantly defended the
veteran-friendly nature of the system and testified that judicial review

would mandate a transformation of the VA's claims ' process from an
informal and non-adversarial administrative system."'
However, many, VSOs and other stakeholders in the disability
system believed that judicial review of the VA's determinations was
necessary for a number of reasons. During Congressional hearings
on the subject, testimony from the BVA was offered as proof that
there was too often an inequity in the awarding of benefits because
there could be "equal cases, identical, where one will get more than
the others." 144 Testimony from VSOs concerned about erroneous
denials of benefits made by the VARO and confirmed by the BVA
with no further review were also offered as reasons for judicial
review of BVA decisions. 145 But perhaps the most compelling
reason offered for judicial review, the right of all Americans to seek
redress in the judicial system, was summed up by testimony from
Sen. John Kerry:
Mr. Chairman, one of the most fundamental principles
of American democracy is the right of all citizens to
have equal access to our judicial system.
Unfortunately, there is still one group of Americans
for whom the guarantee of access to our legal system
does not apply. I am referring to our Nation's
veterans.
Veterans, unlike all other Americans, are denied by
140. See id. at 175 (statement of Sen. John Kerry).
141. See id 188-89 (statement of E. Philip Riggin, Dir. of The American Legion's Nat'l Legis.
Comm'n).
142. See id. at 175 (statement of Sen. John Kerry).
143. The Proposed Veterans' Administration Adjudication Procedure, supra note 138, at 188-89
(statement of E. Philip Riggin, Dir. Nat'l Legis. Comm'n, The American Legion).
144. Id. at 229 (statements of Richard E. O'Dell, Vice President and Chairman of Comm. on
Advocacy, Vietnam Veterans of Am., and Paul S. Egan, Legislative Dir., Vietnam Veterans of Am.).
145. See id. at 229-230 (statement of Richard E. O'Dell, Vice President and Chairman of Comm.
on Advocacy, Vietnam Veterans of Am., and Paul S. Egan, Legislative Director, Vietnam Veterans of
Am.).
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law the fundamental right of access to the American
judicial system. Illegal aliens, prisoners, the mentally
ill and disabled, and Social Security pensioners all
enjoy the right to appeal to the Federal courts.
Veterans do not.
The fact that veterans are denied this basic right is an
archaic, anachronistic result left over from a
paternalistic era in American history.
These
limitations, along with a limit of $10 on attorneys'
fees in veterans' cases, were imposed during the Civil
War era, for the purpose of "protecting" veterans from
legal exploitation. Such "protections" are no longer
needed, or indeed desired, by the vast majority of
veterans today. 146

The larger question of whether the introduction of attorneys into
the VA process has eroded the veteran-friendly system or merely
magnified already existing problems will be discussed in Part IV of
this Article.
The VJRA instituted for the first time a formal appellate route
through the federal court system for veterans to challenge VA
determinations. 147 The VJRA created the Court of Veterans Appeals,
later known as the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims (CAVC). 148 With the creation of this court, veterans could
149
now appeal the determinations of the BVA for judicial review.
However, with the addition of the CAVC, the Federal Circuit noted
that the non-adversarial nature of the entire benefits process was
altered significantly: "It appears the system has changed from 'a nonadversarial, ex parte, paternalistic system for adjudicating veterans'
claims,' to one in which veterans . . . must satisfy formal legal

requirements, often without the benefit of legal counsel before they
are entitled to administrative and judicial review.
Veterans
appealing to the court step out of a system where the veteran is
assured that assistance and benefit of the doubt will be rendered to
them and into a court-environment that is as adversarial as any
courtroom proceeding, where the VA is151represented by attorneys
from the VA's Office of General Counsel.
146. Id.at170 (statement of Sen. John Kerry).
147. See 38 U.S.C. § 7252 (2012).
148. See id.
§ 7252(a).
149. See id.
150. Bailey v. West, 160 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Collaro v. West, 136 F.3d
1304, 1309-10 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
J
151. 38 U.S.C. § 7263(a) (1998).
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The VJRA also changed the limitation on attorney involvement
prohibiting veterans from hiring an attorney until a final decision by
the BVA-a point at which the evidentiary record is already
closed. 152 However, the VJRA did recognize that the fee allowed to
be charged for such representation must be adjusted. 153 During
congressional hearings, it was made clear that the VJRA would not
be a boon for lawyers to get rich quick by helping veterans: "The
truth is that S. 11 carefully limits the amounts that attorneys would be
their attorneys, would be
allowed to receive. Veterans, rather
154 than
the winners with judicial review."
With the creation of the court inevitably came case law binding on
not only the attorneys at the VA's Office of General Counsel and the
Board of Veterans' Appeals, but also on the first line RVSR who has
no legal training and had difficulty implementing the CAVC's
The Veterans Claims Adjudication Commission
decisions. 155
reported in 1996 that with the passage of the VJRA and the decisions
of the CAVC, the disability benefits process had "become more
formal, and the tone of official communications is somewhat more
adversarial."'1 56 The commission cited to the fact that the VA is
represented by lawyers at the court and the increase in complex
rating decisions to support this finding. 157 Attempting to mesh the
growing adversarial nature of the system with the non-adversarial
referred to the new system as
desires of Congress, the Committee
"adversarial paternalism., 15 8
The CAVC quickly realized that a century of discouraging
attorney intervention in veteran disability cases had left a dearth of
interested and competent attorneys to litigate these cases. 15 In 1991,
the Chief Judge of the court wrote to the Attorney General querying
the ethical propriety of having Department of Justice attorneys help

152. Kenneth Carpenter, Why PaternalismIn Review of the Denial of Veterans Benefits Claims Is
Detrimentalto Claimants, 13-SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 285, 285 (2004).
153. See 38 U.S.C. § 7263(c)-(d).
154. The Proposed Veterans' Administration Adjudication Procedure, supra note 138, at 175
(statement of Sen. John Kerry).
155. Oversight on the Veterans Benefits Administration: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Benefits of the Comm. On Veterans' Affairs, 106th Cong. 77 (1999) (statement of Bill Russo, Esq.,
Director, Veterans Benefits Program, Vietnam Veterans of America).
156. THE VETERAN. VA'S CUSTOMER: WHO CLAIMS BENEFITS AND WHY?, VETERANS' CLAIMS
114
(1996),
COMM'N
1,
ADJUDICATION
[hereinafter
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/MelidosianCommission Report Dec 1996.pdf
WHO CLAIMS BENEFITS?].

157. See id.
158. Seeid. at 118 n.96.
159. See Victoria L. Collier & Drew Early, Cracks in the Armor: Due Process, Attorney's Fees,
and The Department of Veterans Affairs, 18 ELDER L.J. 1, 14 (2010).
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present the legal issues before the CAVC as "master amici." 160 The
court asked the executive branch to consider allowing its attorneys to
"advise the Court of any non-frivolous issue capable of being raised
by the [veteran] appellant and assist the Court in understanding the
Record and such issue(s). ' 161 The Office of Legal Counsel
ultimately decided that this type of help would be prohibited by law
the Court
because "[w]hatever the nature of the prior proceedings
type of
The
of Veterans Appeals uses an adversary process.
"master amici" help contemplated by the CAVC would require the
government attorney to actually prosecute a claim on behalf of the
veteran, an act at odds with the adversarial system.' 63 In response to
the lack of attorneys at the CAVC, in 1992, four VSOs proposed a
consortium that would train attorneys to take cases at the CAVC
level on a pro bono basis. 164 Thus, the stage was set for another look
at attorney representation in the veterans benefits system.
1. The Veterans Claims Assistance Act
In 1999, the CAVC decided the case of Morton v. West and
affirmed that the VA's dut to assist only begins when a veteran files
a "well-grounded" claim.' 65

[T]his Court has discerned a Congressional intent to
create a chronological process whereby appellants
who have met the requisite burden, and only those
appellants, are entitled to the benefit of VA's duty to
assist.
[This] unequivocally places an initial burden on a
claimant to produce evidence that the claim is well
grounded or, as we have held, is plausible. This
statutory prerequisite reflects a policy that implausible
claims should not consume the limited resources of
the VA and force into even greater backlog and delay
160. See OFF. OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., OPINIONS OF LEGAL COUNSEL:
CONSISTING OF SELECTED MEMORANDUM OPINIONS, ADVISING THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND OTHER EXECUTIVE OFFICERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
68
(1992),
DUTIES
OFFICIAL
TO
THEIR
IN
RELATION

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles 1/Digitization/l14189ONCJRS.pdf.
161. See id. at 68.
162. WHO CLAIMS BENEFITS, supra note 156.
163. See id. at 70.
164. See

About

Us,

THE

VETERANS

CONSORTIUM:

PRO

BONO

PROGRAM,

http://www.vetsprobono.org/about-us/ (last visited July 4, 2015).
165. See Morton v. West, 12 Vet. App. 477, 485 (Ct. Vet. App. 1999) (interpreting the language
of 38 U.S.C. § 5107 (2012)).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

23

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 3

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 84

those ' claims166 which-as well grounded-require
adjudication.
In direct response to this holding, the VA ordered every VARO to
begin searching initial claims to determine if they were "wellgrounded" and tot withhold assistance if they were not and deny the
claim. 167 Congress went into action relatively quickly and by
November 2000 had codified the Veterans Claims Assistance Act
(VCAA). 16 With the creation of the VCAA, there is no doubt that
Congress' intent was to make the veterans benefits delivery system as
non-adversarial and pro-veteran as possible. While regulating the use
of attorneys in the system as one aspect of attempting to control
adversarial conduct, Congress also codified the long-standing
assumption that the VA's interaction with the veteran is nonadversarial as well. 169 Passage of the VCAA corrected some
misapprehensions of how Congress wanted the process to work and
codified other principles of the system that had been assumed by the
federal courts for several decades.1 70 Congress took out the wellgrounded language and was careful to note that before the CAVC
began interpreting this provision, it had a different meaning to the
VAROs and they had helped any veteran who filed a claim. It was
not until the CAVC began questioning the language that the VARO
began turning veterans away and denying them benefits without wellgrounded claims.1 71 Congress reiterated that all veterans who fill out
the appropriate biographical ' information
on the VA form are entitled
172
to help "as a matter of right."
While the motive behind the VCAA was to ensure a veteranfriendly system in which the veteran would have very little barrier to
entry, the burdens this new law placed on the VA are enormous. A
2002 GAO report on the implementation of the VCAA found that
many VAROs were failing to implement the statute's requirements
and that these errors affected as many as fifty percent of the claims
166. See id.at 480 (quoting Grivois v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 136, 139 (Ct. Vet. App. 1994))
(internal citation omitted).
167. See S. REP. No. 106-397, at 21 (2000).
168. See Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000)
(codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 5100-5107 (2012)).
169. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a)(1).
170. See id; see also S.REP. No. 106-397, at 23 (2000) ("The above delineation of VA-and
claimant-obligations captures the Committee's understanding of the assistance VA had... historically
provided to claimants seeking disability compensation.").
171. See S. REP. No. 106-397, at 22 (2000) ("Irrespective of-and prior to-the Court's
interpretation of the language of section 5107, VA had traditionally assisted claimants 'up front.' In
Morton, the Court ruled that VA is not free to do so-although the Court did note in Morton that
Congress could specify a different rule by statute. The Committee here chooses to do so").
172. See id.
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processed. 173 Testifying before the Veterans Disability Benefits
Commission in 2005, then VBA Undersecretary for Benefits, Daniel
L. Cooper stated:
In my opinion, this was a proper and well-conceived
law that addressed a deficient process under- which
It made our
VA had been adjudicating claims.
adjudicators absolutely responsible for helping each
individual veteran know what to do, what is needed to
substantiate his or her claim, how to respond, and
what we will do to assist him or her. It is also an
example of a law which . 1.74. has been inordinately
difficult to properly execute.'
2. Expanding the Role of Attorneys in the Process
Contemporaneous to the VCAA legislation, some VSOs and the
CAVC itself recognized that attorney representation while claims
were in the agency adjudication process would be beneficial. In
congressional testimony, the Vietnam Veterans of America argued
that attorney intervention at the lowest levels of the VARO would be
beneficial for a number of reasons including the attorney's expertise
in analyzing and applying regulation and a much needed relief valve
for the immense caseload of the VSOs. 175 Similarly, former CAVC
Chief Judge Frank Q. Nebeker posited that involvement of attorneys
at levels below the court would fix many simple errors that occur at
the BVA, causing veterans unnecessary appeals and additional years
of waiting. 176 Chief Judge Nebeker noted that "restricting realistic
access to counsel until after a final BVA decision can cause years of
delay both in adjudication before VA and in discovering the error
through appellate litigation, only to have the matter returned to VA
for readjudication. This happens in many appeals" 17 7 Indeed, Chief
Judge Nebeker also testified before Congress that he believed that
attorney involvement "at the administrative level ... would certainly
make for a more just system, and I think, ultimately a more rapidly

173. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-02-412, VETERANS' BENEFITS: VBA'S EFFORTS
TO IMPLEMENT THE VETERANS CLAIMS ASSISTANCE ACT NEED FURTHER MONITORING 3, 9,11 (2002).
174. VETERANS DISABILITY BENEFITS COMM'N, HONORING THE CALL TO DUTY: VETERANS'
DISABILITY BENEFITS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 336 (2007).

175. See Oversight on the Veterans Benefits Administration, supra note 155, at 78 (statement of
Bill Russo, Esq., Director, Veterans Benefits Program, Vietnam Veterans of Am.).
176. In re Mason, 12 Vet. App. 135, 137 (Ct. Vet. App. 1999).
177. Id. (emphasis added).
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developing system." 178 This point of view has been echoed by
subsequent judges of the court. 179
The court's weighing in on the issue of attorney representation at
the lower levels of the VA did not go unnoticed.
One VSO
responded:
Permitting attorneys to represent veterans for a fee is
inconsistent with Congress' desire that the system
work for veterans in such a way as to avoid that

expense for them. The principle that veterans benefits
should go to veterans and not third parties is the long
standing public policy underlying Congress' refusal to
allow attorneys to involve themselves in the process
for purposes of obtaining fees. By reason of its
apparent lack of understanding of this public policy
and its own desire to review a record like that
produced in litigation rather than an informal claims
record, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims has taken the extraordinary step of
attempting to influence the policy by suggesting in an
opinion that the law should be changed to permit

attorneys to charge fees for representing veterans in

the VA's administrative process.
Nonetheless, in 2006, Congress passed further legislation to allow
attorneys to represent veterans in their claims during the adjudication

process.' 81 This legislation permitted attorneys to begin helping a
veteran after the veteran had received a rating decision from the
VARO and the veteran had affirmatively appealed the decision by
filing a Notice of Disagreement. 182 The VCAA also provided that
this fee be "reasonable" and that the attorney be accredited by the

178. Department of Veterans Affairs Budget Request for Fiscal year 1999. Hearing Before the
Comm. On Veterans'Affairs, 105th Cong. 45 (1998) (colloquy between Chief Judge Frank Q. Nebeker,
Court of Veterans Appeals and Hon. Lane Evans, U.S. House of Representatives).
179. James C. McKay, Who Can Fight For The Soldiers?, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/21/AR2006012100100-2.htmrl.
Chief
Judge Donald Ivers, "who is also a former VA general counsel, stated that 'The Court has historically
taken a position recognizing that involvement of lawyers before the VA could be very helpful, and I
concur.'" Retired Judge Ronald Holdaway, at the 2004 Eighth Judicial Conference of the veterans
appellate court, stated his view that veterans should have the right to counsel at the administrative level:
"I think you would get better records, you would narrow the issues, there would be screening... But the
fundamental reason: Why should veterans be treated differently from anyone else?"
180. Oversight on the Veterans Benefits Administration, supra note 155, at 66-67 (statement of
Rick Surratt, Deputy Nat'l Legislative Dir. for the Disabled American Veterans).
181. The Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-461, § 101, 120 Stat. 3403, 3406-3409 (2006) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 5904 (2012)).
182. 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(2) (2012).
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VA. 183 This legislation was the first formal acknowledgment in over
100 years that veterans may not need such a paternalistic hand when
it comes to hiring an attorney.
3. Duties of the VA - Claim Development and Adjudication
As part of the paternalistic administration of veterans benefits, the
1 84
VA has many duties to veterans who are filing disability claims.
Congress codified many of the VA's historical duties under the
VCAA. 18 5 The codification makes clear that the VA must "make
reasonable efforts to assist a claimant in obtaining evidence
necessary to substantiate the claimant's claim" unless there is no
reasonable possibility that the claim is a viable one.186
The VA is required to assist the veteran in proving his or her claim
by obtaining the veteran's service records, service medical records,
VHA medical records, and any other records held by a federal
agency, including records created by the Social Security
Administration, that may support the veterans claims.187 The VA
also has a duty to provide the veteran with a medical examination
when there is evidence that the veteran has a disability or symptoms
of a disability that may be associated with his service. 88 When there
is not sufficient medical evidence for the VA to make a decision on
the claim, the VA must refer the veteran to a VA medical provider or
administer a "compensation and
a contracted provider who will
189
examination."
(C&P)
pension
If a veteran has been treated by a private physician, the VA has a
duty to attempt to gather these records by requesting them no less
than twice from the provider. 190 If the records are not obtainable, the
VA must notify the veteran of the records the VA was unable to
obtain and advise the veteran that a decision will be made without
this medical evidence unless the veteran can provide the records
himself. 191
The VA has other duties based upon the nature of its nonadversarial process as interpreted by the courts. The Federal Circuit
has held that "[i]mplicit in such a beneficial system has been an
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See id. § 5904.
See id. § 5103A.
See id.
Id.§ 5103A(a)(1)-(2).
See 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(c) (2012).
Id. § 5103A(d).
See 38 U.S.C. § 1703(a)(8) (2011).
Id. § 5103A(b)(1)-(2).
See id. § 5103A(b)(2).
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evolution of a completely ex-parte system of adjudication" and in this
system the VA is expected to 'fully and sympathetically develop the
veteran 's claim to its optimum before deciding it on the merits. ,,192
The CAVC has found that the VA's duty under 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a)
to assist a claimant "in developing the facts pertinent to the claim" is
a separate duty from that of fully developing the veteran's claims. 193
Additionally, the VA also has the duty to give a veteran the benefit of
the doubt when the evidence regarding any material issue in 194a
veteran's claim is balanced between the "positive and negative."'
While these are the statutorily required duties of the VA to a veteran,
Congress also reminded the VA that any other195help offered to a
veteran to substantiate his claim is not precluded.
Congress has also created numerous safeguards in the VA system
to ensure that a veteran has as many opportunities as possible to get a
full and fair review of his claim.196 The VA is unique in
administrative law because the veteran has many bites at the apple to
receive his benefits.. When the veteran gets a decision from the
VARO, the veteran can ask for a more seasoned ratings officer to
perform a de novo review of his claim. 197 When the veteran appeals
to the Board, the Board does an entirely de novo review of the claim
and is not bound by the VARO's decision. 198 Additionally, at any
point in this process, up until appeal to the CAVC, the veteran can
submit new evidence for consideration. 199
4. Veteran-Friendly Standards of Legal Review
In addition to procedural safeguards of the non-adversarial
process, the benefit of the doubt to the veteran can be seen in
interpretation of regulations as well. In the case of Chevron, U.S.A.
Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc., a well-known case
in administrative law, the Supreme Court held that when considering
an ambiguous statute, the courts should defer to a reasonable agency
interpretation of the statutes if (1) Congress did not provide clear
192. Hodge v. West, 15 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-963, at 13
(1988) reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5794-95 (emphasis added)).
193. Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a)).
194. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2012).
195. Id. § 5103A(g).
196. For a concise explanation of the entire appellate process see CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV.,
OVERVIEW OF THE APPEAL PROCESS FOR VETERANS'
CLAIMS 1-4 (Apr. 29, 2013),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42609.pdf
197. 38 C.F.R. 3.2600 (2014).
198. 38 U.S.C. 7104(a) (1996).
199. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.800 (2008); 38 C.F.R. § 19.37(a) (2008).
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direction on how the statute should be interpreted and (2)Congress
granted the agency the authority to interpret the statute. 0 While for
other federal government agencies this principle holds true, it does
not for the veterans compensation system. The Supreme Court made
this clear in the case of Brown v. Gardner. Gardner involved a
federal statute granting benefits to veterans who were injured while
receiving medical treatment at a VA medical facility. 2° 1 The VA had
implemented a regulation requiring that a finding of fault on the
VA's part must be made before the veteran could be granted benefits
for the injury. 202 In upholding a challenge to this regulation, the
Supreme Court did not refer to the two-part test in Chevron. Instead
the Court looked to the language of the statute and found it was not
ambiguous and did not require a finding of fault before a veteran
could be compensated. 203
However, in dismissing the VA's
arguments, the Court went even further to previous case law dating
back to 1940s, well before the Chevron decision, that "interpretive
doubt is to be resolved in the veteran's favor." 20 4 The standard
obviously operates to the benefit of the veteran, but it does not appear
to be predicated on the VA's non-adversarial system. Rather, it
stems from the expression of "nation's gratitude for veterans'
the adverse effects
sacrifice" and in order to "help veterans overcome
20 5
of service and reenter society more readily.,
For years the Federal Circuit struggled with reconciling the
deference to the agency in Chevron and in resolving ambiguity in the
veteran's favor standard of Gardner.20 6 Recently this confusion was
noted in a concurrence written by Judge O'Malley: "Where there is a
conflict between an agency's reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous regulation and a more veteran-friendly interpretation, it is
unclear which interpretation controls." 20 7 In another recent case,
Burden v. Shinseki, the Federal Circuit seemed to assert that the
Gardner presumption emanates from the "veteran-friendly," nonadversarial system not contemplated by the Supreme Court when

200. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
201. See generally Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994).
202. Id. at 116.
203. Id. at 117-18.
204. Id. at 118 (citing King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220-21 (1991)).
205. Linda D. Jellum, Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: Reconciling Brown v. Gardner'sPresumption
That Interpretive Doubt be Resolved in the Veteran's Favor with Chevron, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 68
(2011).
206. See id.
207. Johnson v. McDonald, 762 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 20-14) (O'Malley, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
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Gardner was decided. 208 Over the past decade, the Federal Circuit
has ultimately retired Gardnerto an interesting footnote in history.
However, recently the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has
attempted to reconcile the two standards in Trafter v. Shinseki by
holding that:
Within the complex veterans benefits scheme, if VA's
interpretation of the statutes is reasonable, the courts
are precluded from substituting their judgment for that
of VA, unless the Secretary has exceeded his
authority; the Secretary's action was clearly wrong; or
the Secretary's interpretation is unfavorable to
veterans, such that it conflicts with the beneficence
underpinning VA's veterans benefits scheme, and a
more liberal construction is available that affords a
harmonious interplay between provisions.2 °9
This standard appears to rely on the "beneficence" or paternalism
of the VA system in finding that the Secretary's reasonable
interpretation of a statute must also not be "unfavorable to
veterans. ' 21° While the Gardnerpresumption's future is not as sound
as the doctrine of other precedents, the current opinion of the CAVC
does give veterans a benefit if the veteran can demonstrate that the
Secretary's interpretation of a decision is unfavorable to veterans and
a more liberal veteran-friendly construction is available. This
breathes new life into the Gardner decision and "levels the field a
great deal" in a way that does not exist in other regulatory
211
decisions.
IV. RECONSIDERING

WALTERS

In light of the current framework of the non-adversarial process
just described, a review of how this system actually works seems
prudent. The Supreme Court in Walters relied on the VA's nonadversarial and veteran-friendly process to determine that a veteran's
due process rights do not include hiring an attorney.212 The Court's
view of this beneficent VA process influenced every factor of the
Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test and led the court to determine
that attorneys were not needed in the VA system to ensure due
208. Burden v. Shinseki, 727 F.3d 1161, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (citing Brown, 513 U.S. at 118).
209. Trafter v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 267, 272 (Ct. Vet. App. 2013).
210. Id. See also 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2012).
211. See Prof. Michael P. Allen, Nat'l Ass'n of Veterans Advocates (Sept. 2014) (transcript on
file with author).
212. Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 323 (1985).
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process for a veteran-the government itself ensures due process for
the veteran.2 13
However, as will be discussed below, the
developments in the VA process over the thirty years since Walters
was decided have called into question the Court's assumption that the
VA is non-adversarial. If the VA system is no longer non-adversarial
and working properly, as Chief Justice Rehnquist assumed it was, the
analysis of the Mathews balancing test would be turned on its head.
Additionally, with the Federal Circuit's 2009 decision in Cushman
holding a veteran's property interest requiring due process under the
Fifth Amendment begins at his application for benefits,2 r4 the issue
of attorney representation at the beginning of a veteran's application
seems ripe to reconsider.
As has been demonstrated, the non-adversarial and paternalistic
nature of the VA is a slanting and weaving path through the agency's
history. It has been assumed that the government would review
evidence and grant valid claims for benefits as required by law.
Delay, inefficiency, and the use of the benefits system as a sacrificial
cow for political purposes appear to have surprised a number of
members in Congress. To be sure, the utopian vision of a veterans
disability benefits system that is truly non-adversarial is something to
aspire to. There are obviously provisions built into the system,
through history, culture, and now statutorily and through case law
that are meant to ensure this desirable "benefit of the doubt" to the
veteran is retained in the system. That all deserving veterans are
taken care of is the goal of such a system. It now seems appropriate
to explore the question of whether the VA process in practice is truly
non-adversarial.
Considering the importance of the non-adversarial characterization
of the VA, it is fair to ask what adversarial and non-adversarial mean
in this type of system. It has been noted that veterans will view any
decision made in their favor as being "veteran friendly," while "the
Secretary's perspective on what it means to administer the system in
' 2 15
a 'veteran-friendly' manner, however, requires more exploration."
It has also been suggested that the true meaning of "veteran friendly"
to the VA is that the claims filed by veterans be decided quickly and
with consistency, and that the funds available for veterans' be
distributed in a way that supports all of the VA's programs.2 1 6 To be

213. Id. at333-34.
214. See Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
215. James D. Ridgway, Changing Voices in a FamiliarConversationAbout Rules vs. Standards:
Veterans Law at The Federal Courts, 61 AM. U.L. REv. 1175, 1186-87 (2012) [hereinafter Changing
Voices].
216. See id. at 1187-89.
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sure, the federal courts have long recognized that the veterans
benefits process is different from other administrative adjudications.
The Federal Circuit since the mid-1990s, after the VJRA established
the CAVC, often refers to this non-adversarial nature when
determining questions regarding the VA's benefits system. The
Federal Circuit has referred to the system as "uniquely proclaimant ' '2 17 and "a non-adversarial, exparte, paternalistic system for
adjudicating veterans' claims." 2 18 In 2012, the only other court to
consider the question of whether a veteran's due process rights were
violated by limiting their ability to hire an attorney heavily relied on
the non-adversarial nature of the VA's system. Denying that due
process requires an attorney and other changes in VA procedure, the
and
Ninth Circuit reiterated almost exactly the reasoning in Walters
219
heavily relied on the non-adversarial nature of the VA process.
While the courts and the VA continue to believe the process is
non-adversarial, there is a lot of evidence that veterans themselves do
not believe the system is veteran-friendly. To reconcile these two
points of view, it is important to explore when the VA entered this
period of "adversarial paternalism," a condition the Veterans Claims
Adjudication Commission regards as being brought about by the
creation of the CAVC.
A. The Challenges of Being Non-Adversarial
To determine when the VA system began to creep towards a more
adversarial nature is akin to determining which came first, the
chicken or the egg? There are two possibilities. The first possibility
is that the VA was entirely non-adversarial and veteran-friendly
before the creation of judicial review. This would also assume that
the VA was competently helping veterans to file claims for benefits
while giving them the benefit of the doubt. The VA employees could
do their jobs better Without the meddling of attorneys in the process
making things complicated. Then, with the creation of the CAVC
lawyers began to contaminate the pure non-adversarial system. This
led to VAROs having to comply with more and more complicated
rulings and getting so confused they were unable to do their jobs
properly or efficiently.
In the second scenario, the VA has been steadily creating an
environment where preserving the VA's efficiency is in direct
tension with thoroughly developing claims and resolving any doubt
217. See Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
218. See Collaro v. West; 136 F.3d 1304, 1309-10 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
219. See Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 678 F.3d 1013, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2012).
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in favor of the veteran. The situation requiring the VA employee to
advocate for a veteran and protect the Government's interest is a
difficult dichotomy to reconcile. The court's creation was an attempt
to provide oversight as the system began tilting away from its
purpose without any real method to enforce the non-adversarial
expectations of Congress. Bringing lawyers in to the system brought
problems bubbling beneath to the surface. The fact that the system
was not quite the utopian non-adversarial process that Congress had
ordered meant more pressure and methods that begin to resemble
those found in an adversarial process had to be put in place to fix the
problem.
The evidence from witnesses, advocates, veterans, Congress, and
the VA itself appears to point to the legitimacy of version two: the
VA was not quite so non-adversarial when judges entered the
process, and the judges' appearance brought this reality to the
surface.
It is not difficult to understand how a system meant to be nonadversarial could go awry. Much of the tension in the VA's mission
to be non-adversarial is demonstrated in a rule issued by the
Secretary of the VA regarding due process and appeal rights for
veterans:
Proceedings before VA are ex parte in nature, and it is
the obligation of VA to assist a claimant in developing
the facts pertinent to the claim and to render a decision
which grants every benefit that can be supported in
law while 2 2 protecting the interests of the
Government.
The VA employee here is admonished to assist claimants and
render decisions granting benefits for veterans while protecting the
interests of the Government, which is much like asking an attorney to
engage in a zealous representation of both sides of an issue. 221 James
Ridgway, the Board's Chief Counsel for Policy and Procedure,
explains that this system asks a government employee to be both an
222
adjudicator and an advocate for the veteran.
Balancing the rights of the veteran and the needs of the
Government is extremely difficult to do in the real world. Ronald
Abrams, a nationally recognized expert in veterans law, discussed the
220. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) (2012).
221. Kristi A. Estrada, Welcome Home: Our Nation's Shameful History of Caringfor Combat
Veterans and How Expanding Presumptions for Service Connection Can Help, 26 T.M. COOLEY L.
REV. 113, 128 (2009).
222. James D. Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?.- A ComparativeAnalysis of Appellate Review
by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 1 VETERANS L. REv. 113, 126-27 (2009)
[hereinafter Why So Many Remands?].
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conundrum in an interview:
ABRAMS: After the veteran files a claim, the VA has
a strange and almost Kafkaesque adjudication process
. . . . Because the VA has a huge backlog of
unresolved, unadjudicated claims, it sometimes skips
crucial steps in the processing of these claims. These
errors often adversely affect the fairness of the
adjudication process ....Often, by the time a claim
comes up for a final adjudication before a regional
office, the adjudicators are pressured to finalize the
claim, rather than send it back for additional
development. This is because the regional offices are
evaluated by how many claims they process and how
quickly they process claims. And the VA regional
offices obtain the same work credit for a fast and
inaccurate denial as for a grant of benefits that took
many more hours to adjudicate.
TRIAL: So despite its statutory duty, the government
has little motivation to make sure claims are
developed and adjudicated properly and that the
veterans get their benefits?
ABRAMS: That's right.223
Mr. Abrams goes on to note that often when the VA fulfills its
duties to the veteran, it does so in a half-hearted way.224 For
instance, the VA may deny a claim the same day it attempts to fulfill
the duty to notify by sending a letter to the veteran letting the veteran
know what evidence is missing in his claim application. 25 Inother
insthnces, the VA may technically fulfill its duties, but in a way so
meaningless to the veteran the duty may as well not exist. An
example of this includes the Statement of the Case (SOC) that is sent
to veterans after a veteran formally disagrees with the VA's rating
decision and before a veteran may appeal to the Board of Veterans'
Appeals. 226 Federal regulation requires that "(t)he Statement of the
Case must be complete enough to allow the appellant to present
written and/or oral arguments before the Board of Veterans'

223.
(2006).
224.
225.
226.

Ronald B. Abrams, Representing Veterans in the Battle for Benefits, 42 TRIAL 30, 31-32
See id. at 32.
Id
See 38 C.F.R. § 19.26(d) (2006).
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Appeals.
To accomplish this goal, the SOC must summarize the
evidence, summarize the applicable laws and regulations, and discuss
how these laws affect the determination, and convey the decision of
the VA and the reasons for the decision. 228 In order to fulfill the
mandated requirements for an SOC the VA often copies thirty to fifty
pages of the Code of Federal Regulations, pastes the same language
that the rating decision presents with no appreciable changes, and
sends the package to the veteran. 229 Veterans who are representing
themselves in this process often find themselves slogging through the
Code of Federal Regulations trying to understand why the VA is
sending this information and what to do with it.
Federal Circuit Judge Arthur J. Gajarsa, writing in dissent,
crystalized his concerns when the non-adversarial system fails:
[i]n most cases before the RO the veteran is not
represented by counsel or a veterans service
organization and representation at the Board of
Veterans' Appeals ("Board") is discouraged. As a
result, a veteran's ability to ensure that a fair and
procedurally correct decision has been reached on his
or her claim is limited; so too is his or her ability to
make a well-informed choice whether to accept or
appeal a decision. Thus, VA decisions on records that
are less than thoroughly and adequately prepared may
go unchallenged and the veteran will lose years of
earned benefits that, but for the VA's breach of its
duty to assist, he or she would have collected .... [1]n
a paternalistic system, where a claimant is led to
believe that his or her claim is being fairly and
accurately decided to afford him or her the fullest
compensation he or she is due, it is readily apparent
why a decision may not be promptly challenged. The
VA is charged with the development of the merits of a
claim and acts as final adjudicator as well; there must
be a remedy when it fails in its responsibility. To
allow the organization to default in its development of
a claim and then to adjudicate 23it0 without the
possibility of challenge is an injustice.
The tension between helping the veteran and self-preservation
227. Id. § 19.29.
228. Id. § 19.29(a)-(c).
229. This information is on file with the author.
230. See Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Gajarsa, J., dissenting) (internal
citation omitted).
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discussed earlier exists at the managerial levels of the VA as well.
Mr. Abrams notes that because
VA managers are evaluated in part on how many
claims their offices adjudicate and how fast the claims
are adjudicated, it was in the best interest of the VA
managers to improperly deny claims quickly. This
need to adjudicate claims quickly often puts the VA
regional office at odds with the needs of the
veteran.231
During congressional testimony delivered during the consideration
of the 1988 VJRA, one law professor made clear to Congress that
this tension in the system makes giving the benefit of the doubt to the
veteran difficult. She also noted that oftentimes the VA seems to
have trouble understanding what this legal standard means:
The only guiding principle for the selection of
evidence seems to be that, when an approximate
balance of positive and negative evidence exists, the
BVA will choose that evidence which allows it to
decide the claim against the veteran. The reasonable
doubt doctrine ...

is only applied it seems when the

overwhelming weight of evidence, in fact, supports
the veteran's claim. This is clearly not the intent
behind the current formulation of the doctrine in the
regulations .... 232

Additionally, Professor Bennett goes on to explain that the VA's
adjudication system after the regional office level is a particularly
unleveled playing field for the veteran: "[d]espite professions of
informality and nonadversariality, the VA system is highly
is filled with
adversarial. It is loaded with lawyers on one side, and it 233
side."
other
the
on
claimant
unrepresented
the
for
pitfalls
The DOJ also recognized the eternal struggle inherent in this
system when the Office of Legal Counsel was asked by the CAVC to
allow DOJ attorneys to help veterans in the prosecution of claims
before the VA: "Although the United States has an interest in the
just compensation of veterans, it also has an interest234in ensuring that
benefits go only to veterans who have valid claims."
These examples demonstrate the unenviable position of the VA
231. See Abrams, supra note 223, at 32-33.
232. The Proposed Veterans' Administration Adjudication Procedure, supra note 138, at 6
(statement of Susan D. Bennett, Esq., Assistant Prof of Law and Director, Pub. Int. L. Clinic,
Washington College of Law, Am. Univ.).
233. Id.
234. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 160, at 69.
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employee adjudicating a veteran's benefit in a system that many
believe is much less inclined to be veteran-friendly than it is assumed
to be. There are, however, many more concrete and concerning
examples of the VA process running afoul of its non-adversarial
roots, which are discussed below.
B. Concerns With The System
1. Delay In The System
For the past several years the VA has been bludgeoned in
Congress and the media over the length of time that veterans must
wait to get a first decision on their claims.2 3 5 Many Americans may
be surprised to find out that our most current conflicts did not create

a new issue in delayed decision making for the VA-backlogs have
been familiar to the VA for quite some time. In 1882, amidst
complaints from veterans that the veterans' pension system was slow
in responding to applications, then Commissioner of Pensions
Dudley noted in a report for Congress that 253,648 applications
for
2 36
veterans' pension had been pending for at least two years.

Delay for our current veterans in receiving compensation decisions

is not much better.2 37 In March of 2013, the number of claims that

had been waiting over 125 days for a decision was over 600,000.238
That same year, the VA vowed to reduce these claims, often referred
to as the "backlog," by the year 2015. 23 ' As of July 2015, those
claims waiting over 125 days numbered 127,916.
While the

235. See generally Jacqueline Maffucci, The Battle to End the VA Backlog, Iraq and Afghanistan
Veterans of America, JAVA (2014), http://media.iava.org/2014BattleToEndtheVABacklogPRINT.pdf;

see also Addressing the Backlog: Can the US. Department of Veterans Affairs Manage One Million
Claims?, supra note 30, at 10; Expediting Claims or Exploiting Statistics?: An Examination of VA's
Special Initiative to ProcessRating Claims Pending Over Two Years: HearingBefore the H. Comm. on
Veterans'Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013).
236. See GLASSON, supra note 20, at 182.
237. For more discussion on delay in the VA compensation process, see Michael P. Allen, Justice

Delayed; Justice Denied? Causes and ProposedSolutions Concerning Delays in the Award of Veterans'
Benefits, 5 U. MIAMI NAT'L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REv. 1 (2015); see also Daniel Nagin,

Goals vs. Deadlines: Notes on the VA Disability Claims Backlog, 10 U. MASS L. REv. 50 (2014).
238. Maffucci, supra note 235, at 12, 15.
239. VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., STRATEGIC PLAN TO
ELIMINATE
THE
COMPENSATION
CLAIMS
BACKLOG
(Jan.
25,
2013),
http://benefits.va.gov/transformation/docs/VAStrategicPlan toEliminate the CompensationClaims
_Backlog.pdf
240. See U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., MONDAY MORNING WORKLOAD REPORT:
AND
COMPENSATION
PENSION
RATING
TOTALS,
BUNDLE
http://benefits.va.gov/REPORTS/detailed_claims-data.asp#Reports
(last visited July 6, 2015)
[hereinafter MONDAY MORNING WORKLOAD REPORT].
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backlog numbers are reducing for those claims awaiting a first
decision, many advocates believe that these claims are being moved
quickly through the system at the cost of accuracy in the final
decision of the regional office, a topic discussed below.
Additionally, the number of new claims filed for 2015 has been
estimated to be approximately twenty percent above those
24 1 of 2014, a
burden on the already stressed VA adjudication system.
For those who disagree with the VARO's decision, the wait times
are even longer for an appeal to be heard by the BVA. And the
amount of time appears to be ever increasing, while the VA claims
the backlog is decreasing. The BVA Chairman's most recently
published report to Congress from 2013 accounts that from the time a
veteran files a Notice of Disagreement to the time the BVA issues a
decision averages 1,295 days. 242 The wait time has not yet been
reported officially for Fiscal Year (FY) 2014. While it takes a little
over three and a half years for a veteran's case to be reviewed by a
government attorney and Veterans Law Judge for the first time, the
amount of time the veteran waits if his case is remanded is equally
agonizing. For FY 2013, the BVA remanded approximately 19,115
veterans' cases,243 which took 348 days on average to complete.244
In FY 2014, the BVA remanded 37,162 veterans' cases, a hugely
increased number. 245 Because the BVA has held steady in its number
of remands which hover between forty-two percent and forty-five
percent for the last four fiscal years, this increase in remands would
appear to support that the number of cases at the BVA, and thus
veterans waiting for adjudication, has swelled.246 When these latest
remands were sent back to the VARO for more development, it took
over a year and a half, 581 days on average, for the VARO to
complete the work.2 4 7
In addition to remands to remedy incomplete decisions of the
VARO, the number of claims the BVA has granted a veteran after the
VARO has denied the benefit erroneously is also quite large. The
BVA in FY 2013 granted approximately twenty-six percent of the
241. Jacob W. Sotak, What's in Veterans Affairs' $164 Billion Budget?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20,
2014), http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/20/whats-in-veterans-affairs- 164-billion-budget.
242. See BD. OF VETERANS APPEALS, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., ANNUAL REPORT, FISCAL
YEAR
2013
21
(2013),http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/ChairmansAnnual Rpts/BVA2013AR.pdf

[hereinafter ANNUAL REP., FISCAL YEAR 2013].
243. See id. at 24.
244. See id. at 21.
245. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., BD. OF VETERANS' APPEALS, RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT REQUEST, Apr. 29, 2015 (on file with author) [hereinafter RESPONSE TO FOIA
REQUEST].
246. ANNUAL REP., FISCAL YEAR 2013, supra note 242, at 25.
247. RESPONSE TO FOIA REQUEST, supranote 245.
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claims that it reviewed on appeal by a veteran. 248 This means that a
veteran with a valid claim for benefits waited on average 1,295 days
in addition to the average of 347 days that it took the VARO to
of 1,642
complete the veteran's claim initially
249 in FY 2013, for a total
days, almost four and a half years!

One commentator notes that the real problem with remands is that
Congress has created so many potential theories for a veteran to
obtain service-connection that cases are more complex than they
need be, leading to more difficulty in deciding them at the VARO.2
While this is likely an accurate statement, it does not alter the fact
that remands and delays are here to stay if the system continues in its
current state. The issue of the increasing complexity of the disability
process would also affect any review of the safeguards in place to
ensure that veterans are not being erroneously deprived of their rights
under Mathews.
The argument that long delays in the VA's award of is a violation
of due process is highly persuasive. 25 1 However, it is reasonable to
draw the conclusion that in a non-adversarial, veteran-friendly
system, this delay will be tolerated by the courts in the absence of
some type of willful misconduct on the part of the VA in order to
preserve the non-adversarial environment of the VA. 252 While no
federal appellate court has specifically ruled on the due process
implications of delay at the VA, the CAVC has found in numerous
unpublished dispositions that delays of up to ten years did not require
any extraordinary relief on behalf of the veteran.
248. See ANNUAL REP., FISCAL YEAR 2013, supra note 242, at 24.
249. See MONDAY MORNING WORKLOAD REPORT, supra note 240. See ANNUAL REP., FISCAL
YEAR 2013, supra note 242, at 24. See BD. OF VETERANS APPEALS, REP. OF THE CHAIRMAN, FISCAL
YEAR 2013 21 (2013), http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans AnnualRpts/BVA2013AR.pdf (adding
the amount of time on average the VARO's took to complete a claim with the amount of time on
average the BVA reports veterans wait from the filing of a Notice of Disagreement to the Decision of
the BVA) [hereinafter REP. OF THE CHAIRMAN].
250. See Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?, supranote 222, at 120.
251. See generally Michael Serota & Michelle Singer, Veterans Benefits and Due Process, 90
NEB. L. REv. 388 (2011).
252. See Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1085-86 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(holding that delays resulting in 183 days for initial adjudication and 1,419 days for appeal were not
unreasonable because only four percent of all claims filed are subject to the protracted appellate delays.
The District Court also held that the while the delay in veterans' determinations is significant, "in light
of many of the factors creating these delays, [the court] cannot conclude that the due process rights of
veterans are being violated." The court then went on to discuss the facets of the non-adversarial nature
of the system).
253. See, e.g., Erspamer v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 3 (Ct. Vet. App. 1990) (holding that a ten year
delay was unreasonable, but did not entitle veteran's widow to extraordinary relief and granted the VA
another six months to render a decision on the claim); see Bonner v. Shinseki, No. 12-0874, 2012 WL
1130267, at *1 (Ct. Vet. App. Apr. 5, (2012) (the court held that the VA's failure to process the
veteran's claim through the regional office for seven years was remedied by the VA sending the veteran
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While delay itself might never be held as a violation of due process
in a non-adversarial system, these delays, in addition to other changes
in the VA system over the last thirty years, have pierced the veteranfriendly, non-adversarial veil. Indeed, the VA's continuous adoption
of measures that appear to be harmful to a non-adversarial system
have eroded the "veteran friendly" nature of the VA's procedures to
the point that the beneficence of the process is often obscured or
worse, unrecognizable. Without the protection of the non-adversarial
presumption, delays and other types of actions within the VA should
be looked at for what they are-denials of the right to due process for
our veterans.
2. Equal Access to Justice Act Awards and Remands
The number of cases that are heard by the Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims each year and remanded with Equal Access to
Justice (EAJA) fees ordered is alarming. EAJA is a federal statute
that allows a prevailing plaintiffs attorney to collect fees and other
expenses in a suit against the federal government if the court finds
that the government's position in the case was not "substantially
justified.",254 The Supreme Court has explained that the term
"substantially justified" means "justified to a degree that could
255
satisfy a reasonable person.

In 2010, the Supreme Court expressed concern about the number
of veterans cases that were awarded EAJA fees. Chief Justice
Roberts remarked:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:-70 percent of the time
the government's position is substantially unjustified?
MR. YANG: In cases-in the VA context, the number
is not quite that large, but there's a substantial number of
cases at the court of appealsCHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What number would you
accept?
MR. YANG: It was, I believe, in the order of either 50
or maybe slightly more than 50 percent. It might be 60.
a letter indicating that the VA was now working on the claims but that it had a backlog of claims and it
would take another four to six months: "Assuming arguendo that the Secretary unreasonably has
delayed adjudicating the petitioner's claims in the past, the March 12 correspondence indicates that his
claims are being processed now, and not being delayed arbitrarily") (emphasis added).
254. See Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(1), (d)(2)(F) (2012).
255. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
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But the number is substantial that you get a reversal, and
in almost all of those cases, EAJAWell, that's really
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:
In litigating with veterans, the
startling, isn't it?
government more often than not takes a position that is
substantially unjustified?
MR. YANG: It is an unfortunate number, Your
Honor. And it is-it's accurate.2 5 6
Chief Justice Roberts may be just as concerned to learn in the past
few years the VA's position against a veteran's claim has become no
more reasonable. For instance, in 2014, the CAVC found that the
government's decision regarding a veteran's claim was not
substantially justified in sixty-seven percent of the appeals and
petitions it decided.2 5 7
The amount of cases being awarded EAJA fees is extraordinary for
a number of reasons. First, these EAJA awards are not merely cases
where the VARO and the Board were in error in their decision of a
veteran's claims. These awards represent a lack of reasonableness
when approaching a veteran's contentions in over two-thirds of the
cases that make their way up to the court. This by itself seems to be
indicative of a process that is anything but "veteran-friendly" and
non-adversarial.
The second reason the number of EAJA awards should cause
Congress and the courts to take a harder look at the presumed nonadversarial nature of the VA is because of the small number of
veteran appeals actually heard at the court. It has been said that
"[c]ourts don't create adversarial situations; they resolve them." 25 8 It
is hard to argue that the adversarial situation requiring the granting of
EAJA fees began with the court's review. This situation must have
started at the VARO and been perpetuated at the BVA and the VA's
Office of General Counsel. It is quite often noted that most veterans
do not appeal the decisions of the VARO to the BVA. 25 Of those
256. Transcript of Oral Argument at 52, Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010) (No. 08-1322).
257. U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, ANN. REP. 2 (2014), ANNUAL REPORT
(of the 3524
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2014AnnualReportO6MAR15FINAL.pdf
appeals and petitions decided by the CAVC in 2014, 2356 were awarded EAJA fees-a sixty-seven
percent rate of award. This statistic does not include cases that were dismissed without decision by the
court or the appellant) [hereinafter 2014 ANNUAL REPORT].
258. The Proposed Veterans' Administration Adjudication Procedure, supra note 138, at 117
(statement of Sen. Alan Cranston, Chairman Comm. on Veterans' Aff.).
259. See, e.g., Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1083, 1085 (N.D.
Cal. 2008).
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who do, very few veterans then appeal the decision of the BVA to the
CAVC. 2 60 This lack of appeals of decisions has led courts to believe
that very few veterans are affected by delay and other problems
within the VA system. 26 1 However, Bart Stichman, a noted veterans
advocate, recently noted in testimony before Congress:
The VA often tries to diminish how damning these
statistics are by arguing that only a relatively small
percentage of VA claimants appeal to the BVA and
only a relatively small percentage of those receiving a
BVA decision appeal to the CAVC.
But this
argument fails to take into account the fact that there
are a large percentage of errors in the decisions that
are not appealed. 2
Perhaps, the lack of appeals from the VARO may be explained by
understanding that veterans who have endured the delay in the first
steps of the VA process often choose not to participate after the
VARO decision because they are either beaten down by the delay
and bureaucracy or they believe that the VA must have made the
right decision on their claims because the VA is supposed to be
veteran-friendly. Unfortunately, these veterans who drop out of the
system do not have the benefit of seeking out an attorney to review
their claims and advise them on the possibility of appeal because
these veterans at the VARO level are not permitted to hire a lawyer
for this purpose until these veterans appeal the decision on their own.
There are no numbers captured to determine why veterans drop out
of the claims process when they receive a denial of benefits from the
VA. Looking at the remand rate from the BVA and the CAVC is
instructive.
The VA's failure to comply with its non-adversarial nature is often
a surprise to Congress and other commentators outside the system.
For instance, in testimony before Congress regarding the 1988 VJRA
and the implementation of judicial oversight of the VA's decisions,
one commentator on potential remands from the court assumed the
number would be low because the VA was adjudicating claims as it
should.
In five years or so, this committee could usefully have another
hearing and look at the statistics and see just how many cases get
reversed. I suggest to you, based on the available evidence, that the
federal courts are not going to be overturning the BVA right and left.
260. See Transcript of Oral Arguments, supranote 256; 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 257.
261. See Veterans for Common Sense v. Shineski, 678 F.3d 1013, 1035-37 (9th Cir. 2012).
262. Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs of the
Comm. On Veterans' Affairs, 114th Cong. 4-5 (2015) (statement of Barton F. Stichman, Joint Exec.
Dir., Nat'l Veterans Legal Serv. Program).
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degree of deference to official agency
There is a substantial
263
decisionmaking.
Indeed, in the Walters case, the Supreme Court relied heavily on
the duties of the VA to assist veterans and the ability of the system to
appropriately handle those duties in "simple" cases. 264 The Court did
acknowledge that "[t]he availability of particular lawyers' services in
so-called 'complex' cases might be more of a factor in preventing
error is such cases." 265 At the time of the opinion, the Court posited
that the number of complex cases pending at the VA "are
undoubtedly a tiny fraction of the total cases pending" with the rare
case turning "on a question of law. 266 Today, however, that is
simply no longer the case.
The BVA reports that it receives appeals from approximately four
to five percent of the claims that the VBA decides in a year.2 67 In FY
2013, this meant that only 41,162 veterans chose to have a Veterans
Law Judge at the BVA review the decision of the VARO.2 68 This is
truly a shame; the likelihood is very high that the VARO made the
wrong decision-for the past several years the BVA has remanded
the VARO
for further development or reversed the decision 2of
69
hears.
it
cases
the
of
percent
seventy
over
in
altogether
While the BVA remand and reversal rate may seem extreme, the
rate of remands from the CAVC back to the Board is even more so.
In FY 2013, the BVA issued 41,910 decisions. 27 The same year, the
CAVC received 3,531 appeals. 271 While this number represents
about eight percent of BVA decisions being appealed, this number is
only less than one half of one percent of the 1.17 million claims filed

263.
(statement
264.
265.
266.
267.
VETERANS

See The Proposed Veterans' Administration Adjudication Procedure,supra note 138, at 13
of Eugene Fidell, Esq., Partner at Kores, Feldesman, & Tucker).
See Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330 (1985).
Id.
Id.
See Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1085-86 (N.D. Cal. 2008);
BENEFITS ADMIN.,

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS

AFFAIRS (VA) STRATEGIC PLAN TO

(2014),

11

PROCESS

APPEAL

THE

TRANSFORM

http://www.seankendalllaw.net/library/SVACAppealsReport_140226.pdf
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PLAN].

268. See STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 267, at 11 (other sources report up to four to five percent).
269. See ANNUAL REP., FISCAL YEAR 2013, supra note 242, at 24; see BD. OF VETERANS
APPEALS,
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CHAIRMAN,
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YEAR

http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_AnnualRpts/BVA2012AR.pdf

2012

22

(remanding

(2012),

or

granting

compensation in 74.2% of cases); see BD. OF VETERANS APPEALS, REP. OF THE CHAIRMAN, FISCAL

YEAR 2011 22 (2011), http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_AnnualRpts/BVA2011AR.pdf
(remanding or granting compensation in 72.7% of cases).
270. ANNUAL REP., FISCAL YEAR 2013, supranote 242, at 24.
271. U.S.
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CLAIMS,

ANNUAL

REPORT

1

(2013),

http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2013AnnualReport.pdf.
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with the VA in FY 2013.272 At the same time, since 1995, the CAVC
has remanded over seventy-six percent of the appeals it has decided
back to the Board.273 In FY 2014, that number was even higher at
almost eighty-two percent of cases heard on appeal from the
Board.2 74

While numbers are interesting, what can be learned from all of
these statistics? First, for veterans, it is in their best interest to appeal
denials from the VARO and the Board. The likelihood of success is
extremely high. Second, the high number of remands coming back to
the VARO and Board is indicative of a large percentage of failures
on the VA's part to comply with one of their duties in this nonadversarial system. The benefit of the doubt doctrine at the least
should save many of these cases from these protracted appellate
processes in the first place. Third, the high number of EAJA awards
indicates that quite often the VA takes a position against a veteran
that is not reasonable. All of these practical conclusions from the
evidence detract from the characterization of the current VA
processes as non-adversarial and veteran friendly.
3. Inadequate Medical Examinations and Challenging the
Underlying Opinion
The manner in which the VA fulfills its statutory duties to gather
medical evidence on the veteran's behalf must also be analyzed
carefully. The VARO is required by law to help the veteran attain
medical evidence of the disability and the nexus if the veteran meets
certain criteria. 275 These medical examinations are referred to as
compensation and pension (C&P) examinations and are completed by
medical personnel who are either under contract to the VA or
employed at a VA medical center.276 The medical examiner is
required to do a number of things when the VARO sends a veteran's
claim to receive a medical C&P to determine if there is a nexus
between the claimed condition and the veteran's service.
First, the examiner must review the records in a veteran's claims
272. STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 267, at 12.
273. Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs of the
Comm. On Veterans' Affairs, supra note 262, at 5 (statement of Barton F. Stichman, Joint Exec. Dir.,
Nat'l Veterans Legal Serv. Program).
274. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 257, at 1.
275. See McClendon v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 79, 81 (Ct. Vet. App. 2006).
TO

276. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., AUDIT OF VA's EFFORTS
PROVIDE
TIMELY
COMPENSATION
AND
PENSION
MEDICAL
EXAMS
1
(2010),

https://www.va.gov/oig/52/reports/2010/VAOIG-09-02135-107.pdf;
MANUAL, supranote 31.
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file-a file that can be several thousand pages long. 277 Second, the
examiner must interpret the question sent to them by the VARO
rating specialist-this question changes based upon the facts of the
case. 78 Third, the medical examiner must determine a legal standard
that is foreign to many doctors, "as likely as not.",279 The doctor must
decide if it there is a 50/50 chance that the veteran's service caused
his current condition. 280 This is not necessarily something that VA
examiners are comfortable doing.
Concerns about the medical examination process abound. One
investigation into the quality of medical examinations revealed that
[Q]uality review staff in one office noted that medical
examiners vary in how thoroughly they sift through
the claim files to identify markers. Seven of the nine
medical examiners we spoke with also noted that their
colleagues vary in their level of thoroughness in
reviewing claims related to [military sexual trauma].
For example, one medical examiner cited examples of
examiners who complete exams in 15 minutes
whereas she said it should take multiple hours, if done
correctly. The medical examiner noted that less
thorough reviews might lead to less informed
assessments.281
Despite changes to the training of medical examiners in recent
years, inaccurate and inadequate medical examinations are often2 82the
subject of investigations by the GAO and VA Inspector General.
of medical examinations
VARO employees notice the inadequacy
2 83
as well, and it makes their jobs harder.
We receive exams from VHA not properly filled out,
missing medical opinions, with conflicting opinions
and diagnosis, and incomplete. W[e] complained to
our managers but get no address to this problem. We
also receive complaints from Veterans on being
GUIDE
10
SERVICE
CLINICIAN'S
277. C&P
www.ngwrc.org/docs/Help%20for/o20your%20Claims/cliniciansguide- 1.doc.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 14.
280. Id.
281. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-14-477, REPORT

(March

2002),

TO CONGRESSIONAL

REQUESTERS, MILITARY SEXUAL TRAUMA: IMPROVEMENTS MADE, BUT VA CAN Do MORE TO TRACK
(2014).
18
CLAIM
DECISIONS
OF
DISABILITY
CONSISTENCY
IMPROVE
THE
AND

http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/663964.pdf.
282. See e.g., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., OFF. OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF
VETERANS AFF., and INSPECTION OF VA REGIONAL OFFICE PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND (Nov. 13,

2014), http://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-13-03221-08.pdf.
283. See VA Adjudication Procedure Manual, supranote 31, at § A(1)(d).
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evaluated for complex conditions in "five minutes."
284
Exams are a critical part of the rating process.
Despite training, C&P examiners are having a difficult time
administering competent medical examinations and translating those
diagnoses to writing with a "reasoned medical explanation" for any
conclusions reached.285 Part of this could be a lack of time to spend
doing each examination. Dr. Mark Worthen, a C&P examiner for the
VA who runs the PTSDExam.com blog, notes a discrepancy between
what the VA expects of C&P examiners in terms of production
versus quality. 286 For instance, the VA's Best Practice Manual for
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) Compensation and Pension
Examinations recommends that clinicians should spend three hours
287
for an average C&P exam and longer for more complicated cases.
However, the VA's recent advertisement for a C&P psychologist
position noted that the job required the psychologist to do at least six
examinations a day.2 8 If the best practices for PTSD C&P
examinations were followed, this new job would require the
psychologist to work for eighteen hours a day, assuming that only
simple cases walked in the door. As Dr. Whorten notes: "shall we
work
together
to
stop
sacrificing quality to
achieve
greaterproductivity with C&P exams for posttraumatic stress
disorder and other mental disorders?
Do we not owe as much to
289
Veterans and the American public?,
4. Formalizing the Compensation Process
Another example of the VA's slide away from a veteran-friendly
process in an attempt to increase efficiency occurred in March of
2015 when the VA implemented a new rule requiring claimants to
284. Evaluation of the Process to Achieve VBA Goals: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Veterans' Affairs, 113th Cong. 124 (2014) (statement of Javier Soto, Esq., Former Rating Veterans
Service Rep., Exec. Vice President, Local AFGE 1594, St. Petersburg Reg'l Office, VBA, U.S. Dep't of
Veterans Aff.).
285. See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295, 300-01 (Ct. Vet. App. 2008) (stating that
VA must provide an adequate examination with a reasoned medical explanation for any determinations
made).
286. Mark Whorten, Six C&P Exams Per Day, PTSDExAMS.COM (June 9, 2015),
http://www.ptsdexams.com/six-cp-exams-per-day/.
287. Patricia Watson et al., Best Practice Manual for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
Compensation and Pension Examinations, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERAN AFF., at 22,
http://www.avapl.org/pub/PTSD%20Manual%20fmal%206.pdf.
288. See Whorten, supra note 286. Job Details: Psychologist Compensation and Pension,
Vacancy
No.
BH-15-JL-1320141,
http://www.gocenterjobs.com/view.php?jobid=53013&type=search&auth-sess=fa88dc9babacf0decf7l
c5380f96b818&ref-4c440293b61a0e03820758df8%201/4 (last visited Aug. 17, 2016).
289. Whorten, supra note 286.
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use specific forms to file new claims and to submit Notice of
Disagreements to appeal decisions. 29 Immediately there was an
uproar amongst veterans advocates, VSOs, and attorneys alike.
In keeping with the veteran friendly characterization of the VA,
Congress' statutory guidance on the form and effective date of a
veteran's award are skewed in the veteran's favor. Congress
mandated that a veteran must file an application to receive benefits
from the VA and the date those benefits become effective can be no
earlier than the date the application is received at the VA. 29 1 The VA
is required to help the veteran through the benefits application
process by letting the veteran know when a claim is incomplete and
how to remedy the issue.2 92 Once the veteran is notified of an
incomplete claim, the veteran has one year from the date of notice to
293
submit the necessary information to complete the claim.
Before March 2014, the VA regulation complied with the spirit of
the law and considered any communication from a veteran that
indicated intent to file for benefits an "informal claim." 294 The only
requirement beyond some indication of intent was that the benefit
sought must be noted in the communication. 295
These
communications to the VA could be as simple as "handwritten letters
and simple one-line notes." 296 Once the VA received an informal
claim, an application form would be sent to the veteran and the
veteran had one year after that form was sent to complete his
claim. 97 This application form was considered a "formal claim" and
required a veteran's service history and biographical information,
income verification, and dependent information, among other things.
A veteran was only required to fill this form out the first time he
applied for benefits with the VA. Any subsequent claims could be
informal claims.
The new version of the VA's claim regulation refers to a
290. Catherine Trombley, VA taking guesswork out of filing for benefits by requiringforms,
VANTAGE POINT (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.blogs.va.gov/VAntage/18183/va-taking-guesswork-out-

of-filing-for-benefits-by-requiring-forms/; Form 21-526EZ, Notice to Veteran/Service Member of
Evidence Necessary to Substantiate a Claim for Veterans Disability Compensation and Related
Compensation Benefits, Dep't of Veteran Affairs (2015), http://www.vba.va.gov/pubs/forms/VBA-21526EZ-ARE.pdf; Form 21-0958, Notice of Disagreement, Dep't of Veteran Aft. (2015),
http://www.vba.va.gov/pubs/forms/VBA-21-0958-ARE.pdf.
291. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5101(a)(1), 5110(a) (2012).
292. Id. § §5102(b).
293. Id. § 5102(c).
294. 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a) (2013).
295. See id.
296. Leo Shane III, New VA Benefits Forms Prompt Anger, Legal Challenge, MILITARY TIMES
(Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/benefits/veterans/2015/03/31/va-benefitschanges-lawsuit/70723730/.
297. 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a) (2014).
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"completed claim"-a concept that appears to be a 180-degree turn
from the VA's previous acceptance of "any communication
indicating an intent to file."2 98 The new process allows a veteran to
indicate that he has an intent to file for later benefits by using the
appropriate form. 299 Once the veteran files their intent, the VA will
filled out. 300
send a standardized form to the veteran that must be
However, the veteran has to file a "complete claim" within one year
of sending in the "intent to file" paperwork-note that the old system
allowed the veteran one year from the date the VA sent the
Currently, the
appropriate paperwork out to the veteran.3 °1
"complete claim" system requires a veteran to fill out the equivalent
of a "formal claim" in the previous system each and every time a
veteran wishes to file a new claim for benefits. The claim form is ten
the
pages long, and the VA estimates that each
30 2time a veteran fills
form out it will take approximately an hour.
The VA makes no bones that the purpose of standardizing the
VA's forms in this manner is to benefit the VA. For instance,
regarding the "complete claim" requirement, the VA commented:
VA believes this final rule is less apt to cause
confusion than the alternative, which . . . would
encourage fragmented presentation of claims which
further complicates and delays the development and
disposition of already pending claims by causing
duplicative VA processing actions or creating
confusion regarding the development actions that must
be taken for each claim. Although claimants may
submit new claims at any time, it is far more efficient
to submit all issues under the same benefit in a single
unified claim.30 3
However, in order to attempt to drive their efficiency, the VA
appears to have stepped sideways of at least one statutory provision
granting the veteran one year from the date the VA mails the
appropriate forms to him. In addition to this, the VA's new rules
concern many who; see this as yet another erosion of the nonadversarial system. There is more to the tumult over the VA's new
standardized form process than just changing how things have been
298. Id. See also 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a) (2013).
299. 79 Fed. Reg. 57,695.
300. See id
301. See id.; see 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(a).
302. VA Form 21-256, Information and Instructionsfor Completing the Veteran 'sApplicationfor
Compensation and/or Pension, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFF., at 4 (Nov. 2014),
http://www.vba.va.gov/pubs/forms/VBA-21-526-ARE.pdf
303. 79 Fed. Reg. 57,660, 57,669 (Sept. 25, 2014).
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in the past. There are many concerns that this is yet one more
instance where the VA will be unable to comply with a burden placed
upon them. For instance, Ronald Abrams' the executive director for
the National Veterans Legal Services Program commented that the
"VA's track record on things like this [is] terrible ... When they say
they'll make sure all veterans have access, it may take four months
for them to send out the forms to some folks. Nothing ever happens
as neat or clean as VA says." 30 4 Mr. Abrams was also concerned that
"many veterans filing informal claims are individuals unfamiliar with
VA resources, and the policy change shifts the extra burden on them
to learn the system before starting their claims process."'3 5
It is easy to see why VA delay, already discussed in this Article, is
so worrisome under this new system. With the changes, if the
veteran sends a handwritten note to the VA asking for benefits, the
note does not preserve an effective date for the veteran because he
never used the official "intent to file" form. The VA is required to
send the veteran a "complete claims" form to fill out, but the
veteran's effective date will not begin until he completes the
application form and mails it in. The effect of VA delay in sending
the veteran the appropriate forms could result in months or years of
lost benefits for veterans who get befuddled in this process. While
the VA claims that this new process takes the "ambiguity out of the
system," the American Legion's National Commander referred to the
30 6
change as "a cold-hearted decision that betrays VA's mission."
Additionally, the VA's new rules relieve the VA from another of
its long-standing obligations within the non-adversarial system to
give "a sympathetic reading to the veteran's filings by 'determining
all potential claims raised by the evidence, applying all relevant laws
and regulations. 307 This duty of the VA requires the VA to look at
evidence in a veteran's claims file and identify any other possible
claims the veteran may be entitled to under the law.30 8 Under the
new version of the VA's regulation, the VA is not required to view
the evidence with a sympathetic eye towards unclaimed benefits, but
3 9
will only focus on the benefit claimed by the veteran. 0
304. Shane, supra note 296 (quoting Ron Abrams).
305. Id. (quoting Ron Abrams).
306. See id (quoting American Legion Nat'l Commander Michael Helm).
307. Szemraj v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Roberson v. Principi, 251
F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that although the veteran did not explicitly claim Total
Disability due to unemployability, the evidence in the veterans file indicated that he was unemployed
and the VA had a duty to develop this claim)).
308. Id. (quoting Roberson, 251 F.3d at 1384).
309. 79 Fed. Reg. 57,696 (Sept. 25, 2014) (codified at 38 C.F.R. § 3.155(d)(2)) ("VA will also
consider all lay and medical evidence of record in order to adjudicate entitlement to benefits for the
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Similarly, the changes the VA is making to the first level of appeal
for a veteran, the Notice of Disagreement, is a substantial shift from
an extremely pro-veteran regulation to one that puts a much higher
burden on a veteran. By statute, a veteran is required to submit
notice in writing to the VA that the veteran disagrees with the VA's
decision. 3 10 The former version of the VA's regulations interpreting
this law merely required a written communication "expressing
dissatisfaction or disagreement" and a "desire to contest" for the
communication to be considered an appeal. 3 11 The veteran was also
required to list the determination he disagreed with in the
communication. 3 12 "For example, if service connection was denied
for two disabilities and the claimant wishes to appeal the denial of
the
service connection with respect to only one of
3 13 the disabilities,
clear."
that
make
must
Notice of Disagreement
The current changes to the rule require a veteran to submit the
appropriate form to disagree with the VARO's decision and also to
list much more than the condition the veteran is appealing. "With
respect to the nature of disagreement, the form directs claimants to
indicate, for each appealed condition, whether they disagree with the
AOJ's decision on the question of service connection, disability
evaluation, effective date, and/or any other question. ' ' 3 14 The VA has
again emphasized that this change is being made for the VA's
benefit: "(i)t is not VA's intention to be overly technical .... The
purpose of this final rule is the orderly and efficient processing of
veterans' claims and appeals." The VA also comments that it will
review these forms so as not to prevent legitimate claims from being
processed. However, veterans and advocates have had reason in the
past to be concerned about particular requirements for the wording
veterans who had legitimate claims
and form of appeals precluding
3 15
benefits.
receiving
from
The tension between the VA's new promulgated rules and the nonadversarial system is well summed up by an appellant brief in one of
claimed condition as well as entitlement to any additional benefits for complications of the claimed
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2014/09/25/2014-22633/standard-claims-andcondition."),
appeals-forms#h-3.
310. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a) (2012).
311. 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (2013).
312. See id.
313. Id.
314. 79 Fed. Reg. 57,684 (Sept. 25, 2014).
315. See The Proposed Veterans' Administration Adjudication Procedure, supra note 138, at 6
Law Clinic,
(statement of Susan D. Bennett, Esq., Assistant Prof. of Law and Director, Pub. Int.
Washington College of Law, Am. Univ.) ("We have, for example, had several clients who were
unrepresented at the local level and whose claims have been dismissed by the Board of Veterans'
Appeals for the clients' failures to use particular forms or certain magic words or forms of pleading.").
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the many lawsuits filed regarding this change to the VA's process.
Significantly, the Secretary assumed, without discussing, that
Congress intended administrative "efficiency" to be the priority in
the "non-adversarial" adjudicatory veterans benefits process. To the
contrary, Congress has never expressed concern with VA
"efficiency" to the detriment of veterans' right to a fair, nonadversarial adjudication. Indeed, despite a continuously growing
claims "backlog" over the past two decades, Congress has
significantly added to the Secretary's "duty to assist" and authorize
paid representation after an initial claim denial, while maintaining the
unique multi-step VA appeal process and uniquely lengthy appeal
periods, as well as the unfettered opportunity to submit additional
evidence at any time. All of these Congressional actions made the
VA adjudicatory process less "efficient" as that term appears to be
defined by the Secretary. Indeed, it was the "efficiency" of an
unaccountable VA which issued arbitrary, opaque, and
unreviewable-yet undeniably
quick-decisions that prompted such
316
action.
Congressional
Here we see the historical tension between the VA and Congress.
Congress has built a system that is truly non-adversarial and veteran
friendly and has enacted laws to make the system operate as uniquely
pro-claimant. However, in implementation, the VA is full of
employees who happen to be people-people who do not like to be
pulled in front of Congress and bashed for inefficiencies in the
318
system;
317 who do not like to look like they are doing an inadequate
318
job;
and who are constantly threatened with more work if the
situation does not improve. 319 In light of these realities, it appears
that the truly non-adversarial system Congress envisions is a utopia
that cannot exist. It can only be a glimmer of what Congress hopes it
will be, and even then the glimmer threatens to fade in the face of
316. Brief for Petitioner at 15-16, Veterans Just. Group, LLC v. Sec. of Veterans Aff., (Fed. Cir.
Mar. 20, 2015) (No. 2015-7021), 2015 WL 1383046. Other appellant and amicus briefs on this subject
outline the issues very well and include The American Legion, AMVETS, The Military Order of the
Purple Heart, and Vietnam Veterans of America. See Brief for Petitioners, Nat'l Veterans Legal Servs.
Program v. McDonald, (Fed. Cir. May 14, 2015) (No. 15-7061); Corrected Claimant-Appellant Brief,
Nat'l Org. of Veterans Advocates v. Sec. of Veterans Aff., (Fed. Cir. Mar. 25, 2015) (No. 2015-7025);
Brief of Amici Curiae, Veterans Justice Group, LLC v. Sec. of Veterans Aff., (Mar. 26, 2015) (No.
2015-7021).
317. See, e.g., Expediting Claims or ExploitingStatistics?, supra note 235.
318. Bill Spencer, Houston VA Employee Manipulated Claims, CLICK2HOUSTON.COM (Sept. 30,
2014, 7:15 PM); Abrams, supra note 223, at 33.
319. See Evaluation of the Process to Achieve VBA Goals, supra note 284, at 5 (statements of
Javier Soto,Esq., Former Rating Veterans Service Rep., Exec. Vice President, Local AFGE 1594, St.
Petersburg Reg'l Office, VBA, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Aff.; Ronald Robinson, USA Ret., Senior
Veterans Serv. Rep., AFGE Local 520, Columbia Reg'l Office, VBA, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Aff).
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encroachment.
5. Changing the Language
It is not only the VA that struggles with the implementation of a
non-adversarial system. The courts also wrestle with the historically
non-adversarial nature of the VA while implementing procedures that
appear to be more and more adversarial. One example of this
struggle is seen in the Federal Circuit's 2013 decision in Parks v.
Shinseki, which made clear that veterans waive the right to challenge
medical practitioners if the challenge is not brought up in the
320
adjudicative, non-adversarial stages of the compensation process.
In Parks, the veteran had filed claims for disabilities that he believed
stemmed from his exposure to certain chemicals in service. 32 1 The
VA denied his claims and the veteran appealed with the help of a
non-attorney VSO representative to the BVA.3 22 The BVA denied
the veteran's appeal and the veteran then hired an attorney to
represent him at the CAVC.3 2 3 The attorney argued, for the first time
in the veteran's case, that the medical opinion of the nurse
practitioner hired by the VA was not "competent medical
evidence." 324 The CAVC affirmed the BVA's decision and the case
was then heard at the Federal Circuit. 325 The Federal Circuit found
that because the VA has the right to a rebuttable presumption that the
medical professional chosen to provide an opinion was properly
chosen, the veteran's argument failed. 326 The court found that the
veteran had waived any rights he had to rebut the presumption
because he failed to raise the "objection" that the nurse practitioner's
opinion was not "competent medical evidence" either at the VARO,
where the veteran was pro se, or at the BVA, where he was
represented by a non-attorney VSO representative. 327 The dichotomy
of the Federal Circuit's opinion here and the court's insistence in
other cases that the VA is a non-adversarial process at the VARO and
BVA levels is striking. The Federal Circuit in this instance is
requiring a veteran to make an objection, which smacks of the
adversarial process, at levels of the VA where the veteran is not

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

See Parks v. Shinseki, 716 F.3d 581 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 582.
Id. at 583.
Id.
Id.
Parks,716 F.3d at 583-84.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 586.
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permitted to hire an attorney. 328 If the veteran fails to raise this
adversarial objection at the non-adversarial stages of the process, his
case is impacted in the following adversarial stages of the federal
courts.
To add to confusion of mixing seemingly adversarial steps into a
non-adversarial process, in 2014 the CAVC decided the case of Nohr
v. McDonald,which held that veterans may request information from
the VA in order to challenge a medical examiner. 329 While the court
did not like referring to these questions as "interrogatories,, 33 0 for all
intents and purposes the device described by the court is similar to
the discovery device used at the commencement of litigation. 331
Consideration of this case is extremely instructive when reviewing
the tension between acknowledging that the VA's goals do not
always align with the veterans and trying to preserve the appearance
of a non-adversarial system.
During a C&P medical examination for Mr. Nohr's claim of
dysthymic disorder, the examiner noted that "[tihere is obvious and
manifest evidence that [Mr. Nohr's] preexisting dysthymic disorder
was not aggravated by service." 332 On remand from the CAVC, the
C&P examiner was asked to provide adequate rationale to support
her conclusion regarding aggravation.
In response to this
addendum opinion, Mr. Nohr submitted eleven questions and
requests for documents for the examiner to answer regarding the
medical opinion. 334 The questions the veteran submitted were
labeled "interrogatories. ' ' 335 The veteran also asked that, in the
alternative, the doctor be subpoenaed by the Board to appear at his
hearing.336 The Board denied the veteran's claim and his requests of
the C&P examiner, noting that "[t]here is no VA regulatory authority
for interrogatories, and it is stressed that the benefits system is nonadversarial., 337 On appeal to the CAVC (for the third time in this
case), Mr. Nohr argued that the Board violated his Fifth Amendment
rights to procedural due process when it denied him the ability to
question the medical examiner concerning her opinion. 338 The
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

For a discussion on this issue see Allen, supra note 237.
See Nohr v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 124 (Ct. Vet. App. 2014).
Id. at 131, 133.
FED. R. Civ. P. 33.
Nohr, 27 Vet. App. at 127.
Id.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 127-28.
Id. at 128.
Nohr, 27 Vet. App. at 128.
Id. at 129.
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Secretary argued that, in this process, veterans have no procedural
due process right to submit interrogatories to the C&P examiners or
to confront them at a hearing. 339 The court in dicta suggested that
the Board's refusal to send Mr. Nohr's questions and
request for documents to Dr. Feng and its
corresponding statement stressing the nonadversarial
nature of the VA benefits system looks like a kneejerk reaction based upon Mr. Nohr's characterization
With the
of his questions as "interrogatories."
increasing involvement of attorneys at the
administrative level and the corresponding complexity
that attorney involvement can generate, the veterans
bar and VA must proceed with caution so as not to
unravel Congress's desire to preserve and maintain the
unique character and structure of the 3paternalistic,
nonadversarial veterans' benefits system. 40
The court noted that a claimant in the veterans benefits system
must provide particularized reasons challenging the competency of a
medical expert providing an opinion. 341 In this case, Mr. Nohr had
no way of laying out his particular challenges without answers to his
questions.

342

The court went on to hold that Mr. Nohr's questions to determine
the competency of the examiner and requests for documents held by
a VHA employee were reasonable.343 The VA's duty to assist the
veteran extended to providing him with the information and federally
held documents to sufficiently aid in the development of his case or
provide him with the reasons and basis for a refusal.344 The court
declined to address the Constitutional issue regarding a violation of
Mr. Nohr's Fifth Amendment due process rights, because the
regulatory duty to assist and the Board's failure to provide the
reasons and basis for their decision to deny Mr. Nohr this information
were sufficient to answer the questions before the court.345
The Nohr case breaks new ground in the arena of veterans'
benefits, because it acknowledges that veterans have the right to ask
reasonable questions during the adjudicative stage of the process in
order to obtain evidence to question the competency of the examiner.
This type of evidence is extremely similar to the interrogatory
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

Id. at 130.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 132.
Nohr, 27 Vet. App. at 133.
See id.
See id. at 133-34.
See id. at 134.
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process found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 4 6 Despite the
court's dislike of the use of the term "interrogatory," the purpose is
the same-to compel an opposing paty to disclose information in
order to challenge that party's position.
Both the Parks and the Nohr cases exemplify the contradiction of
the non-adversarial system that is required to employ variations of
adversarial procedures to ensure equity. These cases are both
indicative of an acknowledgement by the courts that the VA's
process is not purely non-adversarial.
6. Scandals
In the last two years, the VA in both the Veterans Benefits
Administration and the Veterans Health Administration has been rocked
by scandal and embarrassment. According to Congressman Jeff Miller,
chairman of the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs, "[o]ne of the
biggest oversight challenges we've encountered is just getting VA to
agency's biggest problem,
engage in an honest conversation." 348 34"The
9
he said, is a 'culture of complacency.'
In April of 2014, news broke that the VA Medical Center in Phoenix
had been covering up a rather long list of veterans waiting for medical
appointments to make their statistics on accessibility look better in
Unfortunately, this practice resulted in a number of
reports. 350
extremely ill veterans dying while on the waiting list at Phoenix for
approximately five times longer than officially reported. 351 As the
Phoenix scandal broke, whistleblowers at other VA medical facilities
came forward to expose more waiting list discrepancies. 352 In the wake
346. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33.

347. Nohr, 27 Vet. App. at 131, 133.
348. Aaron Glantz, VA's ability to quickly provide benefits plummets under Obama, CTR. FOR
INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Mar. 11, 2013), http://cironline.org/reports/vas-ability-quickly-providebenefits-plummets-under-obama-4241.
349. Id.
350. See Scott Bronstein & Drew Griffin, A fatal wait: Veterans languish and die on a VA
hospital's secret list, CNN (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/23/health/veterans-dyinghealth-care-delays/.
351. Matthew Daly & Terry Tang, VA Chief 18 Vets Left Off Waiting List Have Died,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 6, 2014, 5:35 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/senate-moves-toward-voteva-health-care; see also Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Michael Shear, Severe Report Finds V.A. Hid Waiting
Lists at Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/29/us/va-reportconfirms-improper-waiting-lists-at-phoenix-center.html?_r=0.
352. See Scott Neuman, Report Finds Evidence of Secret Wait Lists at VA Hospitals, NPR.org
4
28 3
(May 28, 2014) http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/201 /05/ / 16712039/report-finds-evidenceto 'Unauthorized'Waiting List at
VA
Admits
Blasius,
Melissa
see
also
of-secret-wait-lists-at-va-hospital;
AM),
11:35
2014,
30,
(Apr.
9NEWS.COM
Hospital,
Denver
2
http://www.9news.com/story/news/investigations/casualties-of-care/ 0 15/01/29/denver-va-
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of these discoveries, Secretary of the VA, Eric Shinseki, resigned in
May 2014, admitting that this fraudulent manipulation of information
and veterans had occurred due to "systemic" problems inside the VA.35 3
On the benefits side, revelations that occurred in early 2015 were just
as damaging. Whistleblowers in the Oakland, California VARO
reported that the VARO had hidden over 13,000 veterans claims filed
between 1996 and 2009 in a filing cabinet. 354 The files were unearthed
in 2012, but by that time half of the veterans had already passed away.355
The whistleblowers reported that they were ordered to mark each file
"no action necessary," whether that assessment was accurate or not. 356
The whistleblowers stories were confirmed by the VA's Inspector
General who reported that "'poor record keeping' in Oakland"
prevented his office from determining how many veterans were affected
and did not receive benefits, citing the fact that "thousands of records
were missing when inspectors arrived., 357 The whistleblowers voiced
concern that these 13,000 files were indicative of a bigger problem at
the VA-a misrepresentation
of how many claims are actually pending
358
for decision.
The Oakland VARO scandal was not the only hidden or misplaced
claims issue the VA had in the past two years. In 2014, the Baltimore
VARO was cited by the VA's Inspector General for having 9,500
veterans files unaccounted for and lying around on employee's desks.359
A VARO employee in Houston was found to have altered digital
information for 136 veterans' claims files to make the files appear
completed when they were not. 360 The employee admitted that the
purpose of altering the files was to make his production numbers look
better than they were.36 1 In Philadelphia, the Inspector General found
that over 16,000 pieces of mail had not been scanned into the claims
system and 31,000 inquiries had not been responded to. 362 The
whistleblower/22535211/. .
353. Greg Jaffe & Ed O'Keefe, Obama accepts resignation of VA Secretary Shinseki, WASH. POST
(May 30, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/shinseki-apologizes-for-va-health-carescandal/2014/05/30/e605885a-e7fO- 1e3-8f90-73e071 f3d637_story.html.
354. Whistleblowers: Veterans Cheated Out of Benefits, CBS NEWS (Feb. 25, 2015, 7:49 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/veteran-benefits-administration-mismanagement-uncovered-ininvestigation/.
355. Id.
356. See id.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. OFF.OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, OFF. OF AUDITS & EVALUATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF
VETERANS AFF, REVIEW OF ALLEGED MAIL MISMANAGEMENT AT THE BALTIMORE VA REGIONAL

OFFICE (July 14, 2014), http://www.va.gov/oig/pubs/VAOIG-14-03644-225.pdf.
360. Spencer, supranote 318.

361. Id.
362. Ben Kesling, Philadelphia VA Benefits Center Investigation Uncovers Problems,
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investigation also found that wait times on claims and quality reviews
had been manipulated in order to report fraudulent statistics on
claims. 363 Again, in each of these instances, one can see the tension for
a VA employee who is asked to adjudicate claims to the benefit of the
veteran, but who also has personal desires to appear successful in one's
job.
The toll that these scandals have taken on veterans is
immeasurable. However, some information on veterans' overall
perspective of the system can be gleaned from polling. For instance,
in a 2013 Washington Post/Kaiser Family Foundation poll, over fifty
percent of the veterans polled rated the VA as doing a "fair or poor"
job at taking care of veterans' needs. 3 64 Interestingly, this poll was
taken about four months before the fact that dozens of veterans may
have died while lingering for years on secret waiting lists for care at
the Phoenix VA Medical Center scandal was revealed in the press. 365
No polling after this scandal is available. The town hall meetings
that the VA has introduced to repair relationships between veterans
and the VA after the Phoenix scandal revealed veterans nationwide
who are discouraged by the VA process. 366 The oft repeated
comment on the VA's attitude towards veterans "delay, deny. until I
die" is heard echoed by veterans at many of these town halls.

WALL ST. J. (Apr. 15, 2015, 4:35 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/philadelphia-va-benefits-centerinvestigation-uncovers-problems-1429130142.
363. Id.
364. After the Wars - Post-Kaisersurvey of Afghanistan and Iraq war veterans, WASH. POST (Oct.
20, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/polling/wars-postkaiser-survey-afghanistan-iraqwar/2014/11/12/3e8f2380-b7a6-1 1e3-9eb3-c254bdb4414dpage.html.
365. See After the Wars - Post-Kaisersurvey and Iraq war veterans - Results and methodology,
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/nationalafter-the-wars-post-kaiser-survey-of-afghanistan-and(last visited Aug. 17, 2016); Rajiv
iraq-war-veterans-results-and-survey-methodology/901/
Chandrasekaren, A legacy of pain and pride, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2014),
Timeline: The
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/204/03/29/a-legacy-of-pride-and-pain/;
22,
2014),
TODAY
(May
Scandal,
USA
the
VA
Story
Behind
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/05/2 1/veterans-healthcare-scandal-shinsekitimeline/9373227/.
366. See Shane, supranote 296; see also Regina Dennis, FrustratedVeterans Sound Off at Waco
PM),
17,
2014,
8:01
(Sept.
WACO
TRIBUNE
Town
Hall,
VA
Office
http://www.wacotrib.com/news/military/frustrated-veterans-sound-off-at-waco-va-office-townhall/article_9bb8leda-7c3e-5a61-9a86-d4bbf3ee6bde.html; see also Minneapolis veterans: 'The VA
8:19
PM),
12,
2014,
(Sept.
FOx9.cOM
be
ashamed',
should
http://www.myfoxtwincities.com/story/26515834/veterans-have-a-voice-at-minneapolis-va-town-hallmeeting.
367. See Mike Ricci, Delay, Deny, Until You Die, SPEAKER.GOV (Apr. 25, 2014),
(quoting one veteran in Missouri as
http://www.speaker.gov/general/delay-deny-until-you-die
commenting "Delay, deny, until you die. That's what the veterans are saying now"); see also Joey
Hollrnan, Colunbia VA town hal meg &ns bm dans gre seon, THE STATiE(Aug 14, 20141
http://www.thestate.com/news/local/military/articlel3876091.html (quoting one veteran as commenting
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7. Crumbling VA Regional Office Environments
While much may be said about problems at all levels of the claims
process, the best place to focus Congress' attention to fix the delay
and erroneous decision concerns is at ground level, the VARO. The
evidence appears to indicate that the environment of the VARO and
senior VA leadership's attitude towards this major component of VA
success or failure has been poorly thought-out and executed on both
personnel and procedural levels.
The VARO employees have become the whipping boy for the
delays and errors that senior leaders of the VA are often called before
Congress to explain. Congressman Jeff Miller, chairman of the
House Veterans Affairs Committee is quoted as saying, "The vast
majority of the 300,000 employees at VA are dedicated and are hardworking. They deserve better than to have the reputation of their
organization dragged through the mud by a bunch of executives too
busy patting themselves on the back to take responsibility."' 368 A
number of whistleblowers from VAROs across the country have
come forward to expose what otherwise would have been internal
practices of the VAROs. One employee notes that many of the
problems at the VARO level have emanated from the senior
leadership of the VA planning large-scale solutions to problems and
giving the VAROs
no clear plan of how to achieve the
36 9
expectations.
Several whistleblowers shared concerns with Congress that instead of
investing in training and experienced on-the-ground leadership across
the VARO system, the quality of supervisors managing VARO
employees is haphazard at best. For instance, one whistleblower reports
that "[t]he VBA call their supervisors in the Veterans Service Center
coaches. A coach for a team is required to know claims development,
rating, and adjudication. However, few have the technical skills to
instruct employees in more than one area." 370 Another employee
testified about concerns that employees were being pressured to rate
at the Columbia, SC town hall that "a lot of veterans are saying the VA is just waiting for us to die or to
quit trying").
368. Evaluation of the Process to Achieve VBA Goals, supra note 284, at 114 (statement of
Ronald Robinson, USA Ret., Senior Veterans Serv. Rep., AFGE Local 520, Columbia Reg'I Office,
VBA, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Aff.) (quoting Press Release, Legion Convention: Chairman of House
Committee on Veterans' Affairs Vows to Keep the Pressure on VA to Reduce Claims Backlog (Aug. 28,
2013), http://www.legion.org/pressrelease/217033/chairman-house-committee-veterans / E2%80%99affairs-vows-keep-pressure-va-reduce-claims)).
369. See id. at 120 (statement of Ronald Robinson, USA Ret., Senior Veterans Service Rep.,
AFGE Local 520, Columbia Reg'I Office, VBA, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Aff.).
370. Id. at 116 (statement of Ronald Robinson, USA Ret., Senior Veterans Service Rep., AFGE
Local 520, Columbia Reg'l Office, VBA, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Aff.).
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claims without adequate information or in violation of law to clear the
backlog.
"Changing the Game" rules have resulted in exams
denied to veterans during increase claims by pressure to
rate on available evidence that may not meet legal
requirements . . . . A great concern in training and
development of raters is that claims are not assigned for
processing based on complexity of claim and tenure and
experience of the employee. Tied to the push for
"production," is a disregard for position description
procedural guidance for new raters. This leads to
needless quality issues and delays in claims processing
.... Because of changes seemingly appearing to conflict
training and law, some raters refused to follow the new
The claims were
rules without written directives.
reassigned to others willing to perform them as
requested.3 71
Add to these pressures on VARO employees the mandatory overtime
that the VA has required, totaling $153,297,189 in taxpayer dollars from
2012 through 2014,372 and you have a working environment in which
employees feel pressure to hurry through claims and fraudulently enter
information or hide files to hide mistakes, a problem already discussed
in this Article.
Many of the other problems for the VARO appear to be due to a
lack of planning on VA's part to meet the ambitious goals set to wipe
out the backlog by 2015. 373 For instance, the VA announced in
January 2013, that the VA was beginning a transition to a paperless
claims system.37 4 The VA began promoting online claims through
the E-Benefits software system as the easiest way for a veteran to do
his claim himself.375 However, it appears that no thought was given
to the consequences of veterans filing claims themselves on the VA's
E-Benefits website, leaving hundreds of thousands of veterans'
371. Id. at 123-24 ((statement of Javier Soto, Esq., Former Rating Veterans Serv. Rep., Exec. Vice
President, Local AFGE 1594, St. Petersburg Reg'l Office, VBA, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Aff.).
372. See id. at 115 (statement of Ronald Robinson, USA Ret., Senior Veterans Serv. Rep., AFGE
Local 520, Columbia Reg'l Office, VBA, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Aff.).
373. See Evaluation of the Process to Achieve VBA Goals, supra note 284, at 118 (statement of

Ronald Robinson, USA Ret., Senior Veterans Serv. Rep., AFGE Local 520, Columbia Reg'l Office,
VBA, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Aff.).
374. News Release, Dep't of Veterans Affairs, Office of Public Aff. Media Relations, National
14, 2013),
System Underway, (Jan
of Paperless Claims Processing
Deployment
http://www.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfn?id=2418.
375.

VA Claims System: Review of VA's Transformation Progress:HearingBefore the S. Comm.

on Veterans'Affairs, 113th Cong. 16-17 (2013) (statement of Allison A. Hickey, Under Secretary
for Benefits, Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), U.S. Dep't of Veterans Aff.),
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claims unprocessed:,
VA spokeswoman Meagan Lutz said since February
2013, just over 445,000 online applications have been
initiated.
Of those, approximately 70,000
compensation claims have been submitted and another
70,000 nonrating (add a dependent, etc.) have been
submitted, leaving a total of 300,000 incomplete
claims. Because a number of claims started are more
than 365 days old, they have now expired,
totaling an
376
claims.
unprocessed
230,000
estimated
Additionally, a project to scan veterans' claims files at the VA ran
into snags when the contractor hired advised the VA "it would take
approximately 4000 employees to scan the required 600 million
pages a month for rollout." 377 The VA has hired two new contractors
to attempt to meet this ambitious goal and has set a centralized mail
processing center where all veterans and veteran advocates are
required to fax all information relating to a veteran's claim if a digital
VA system is not used to file the claim.378 However, the details of
the new centralized scanning are murky, a search for the program
online yields little result, and the VA sprung the news about this
project on veterans and advocates alike with no warning or
preparation. 379 Interestingly, requiring veterans and advocates to fax
all documents to the central scanning facility and discouraging mail
directly to the VARO runs afoul of the law on specific
communications with the VA that require they be
sent directly to the
"agency of original jurisdiction"-(the VARO). 380

376. Bob Brewin, Hundreds of Thousands of VA Electronic Disability Claims Not Processed,
NEXTGov.COM, (July 3, 2014), https://healthcarereimagined.wordpress.com/2014/07/11/hundreds-ofthousands-of-va-electronic-disability-claims-not-processed-next-gov/.
377. Evaluation of the Process to Achieve VBA Goals, supra note 284, at 118 (statement of
Ronald Robinson, USA Ret., Senior Veterans Service Rep., AFGE Local 520, Columbia Reg'l Office,
VBA, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Aff.).
378. See id.at 119 (statement of Ronald Robinson, USA Ret., Senior Veterans Service Rep.,
AFGE Local 520, Columbia Reg'l Office, VBA, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Aff.).
379. See
e.g.,
Veterans
Benefits
Network,
YUKU.COM,
http://vets.yuku.com/topic/127515/CENTRALIZED-MAIL-PROCESSING-CMP#.VaAmUk3bJLM
(last visited Jan. 21, 2016).
380. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(1) (2012) ("Such notice [of disagreement], and appeals, must
be in writing and be filed with the activity which entered the determination with which disagreement is
expressed (hereinafter referred to as the 'agency of original jurisdiction.')").
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V. REEXAMINING A VETERAN'S DUE PROCESS

A. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge Test in Light of New Evidence:
Challengingthe Non-AdversarialPresumption

The review above of just some of the concerns of the VA benefits
compensation process calls into serious question the contention that
the VA is an entirely non-adversarial, veteran-friendly process. In
the Walters case, the Supreme Court determined that veterans have
property interests in their disability benefits that trigger Fifth
Amendment due process rights and protections.381 While this Article
does not argue that the Walters decision was improperly decided at
the time, at the thirty year anniversary of the Walters decision, it
seems fair to reevaluate the possibility of the erroneous deprivation
of a veteran's property interests and the basic presumption of a nonadversarial system that led to a limitation of veterans' constitutional
rights.
When evaluating what due process was required for veterans in the
compensation process, the Supreme Court weighed the Mathews
factors previously discussed.3 82 When determining the first factor, if
a private interest will be affected, the Court assumed that this factor
was met and veterans have an interest in their benefits.383 This is still
true today and has not changed.
The Court then turned to the second factor, the risk of erroneous
deprivation of these benefits and the probative value of governmental
safeguards to prevent that risk.384 In evaluating this factor, the Court
made many assumptions that are no longer true today.
First, the Court assumed that most claims filed by veterans are
simple. 385 The Court also believed that there was no evidence that
386
the VA system was "procedurally, factually, or legally complex."
These assumptions are obviously no longer true. There have been
numerous commentators already cited who have discussed the ever
increasing complexity of the claims process. 387 Complexity is one of
blamed for the amount of remands from the BVA and the
the factors
38 8
Court.

381. Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 332 (1985).
382. See id. at 321-34.
383. See id. at 321-22.
384. See id. at 327-34.
385. See id. at 330.
386. Walters, 473 U.S. at 328-30.
387. See, e.g., Trafter v. Shinseki, 26 Vet. App. 267, 272 (Ct. Vet. App. 2013); see VETERANS'
CLAIMS ADJUDICATION COMM'N, supra note 156, at 114.
388. See Ridgway, Why So Many Remands?, supra note 222, at 119.
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Second, the Court relied on the assumption that very few veterans
would be affected by errors in the system that an attorney might help
to remedy. 389 This assumption was based on the very few number of
claims that are appealed in the system. 39 As previously discussed,
the fact that a small percentage of veterans appeal claims does not
391
correlate to the true number of potentially erroneous decisions.
The remand rate also contradicts
the assumption that most claims are
392
being decided appropriately.
Third, the Court chastised the lower court for assuming that the
system was not working properly in the absence of concrete
evidence. 393 The number of scandals involving hidden claims files
and fraudulently changed files combined with poor medical
evaluations and monstrous delays in delivering these benefits bely
the assumption that the system is working as it should.3 94 The
environment at the VAROs charged with processing these claims
is
395
also preventing the system from working as it was meant to do.
Fourth, the Court relied heavily on the fact that veterans benefits
are administered in a veteran-friendly environment with "a decisionmaker whose duty it is to aid the claimant . . . , significant
concessions with respect to the claimant's burden of proof," and
other procedural safeguards. 396 While the VA's duties were not
codified at the time of the Walters opinion, it is obvious that the
Court assumed the VA was helping a veteran through the process.3 97
The advent of newly required forms to file and appeal claims that eat
away at advantages to the veteran and the attempt to shift burdens to
the veteran to "speed things up" are examples of the needle moving
towards a less veteran-friendly environment than was envisioned by
the Court. 3 98 Additionally, the enormous number of cases where the
CAVC finds the VA has taken a position against a veteran that is not
"reasonable" demonstrates the reality that the system is failing to
399
work in a non-adversarial manner.
Finally, the Court weighed the third factor of the Mathews test, the
389. Walters, 473 U.S. at 330.
390. See id. at 327-28.
391. Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs of the
Comm. On Veterans' Affairs, supra note 262, at 4-5 (statement of Barton F. Stichman, Joint Exec. Dir.,
Nat'l Veterans Legal Services Program).
392. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 242, at 1.
393. See Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 329 (1985).
394. See supra Part I.B.
395. See supra Part fl.B.7.
396. See Walters, 473 U.S. at 333-43.
397. See id. at 329, 333-34.
398. See supraPart I.B.
399. See supraPart l.B.2.
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Government's interest in preventing veterans from hiring
attorneys. 40 0 The Court succinctly summed up the Government's
interest in this case as preserving the non-adversarial system. 40 1 If
one agrees with the previous discussion, that the non-adversarial
system is being steadily eroded without attorneys being involved at
the earliest first-level adjudications of the VA, it is hard to see how
attorneys could do much more harm. Social Security claims provide
an example of attorneys successfully helping clients navigate a
complex and non-adversarial system. 40 2 Claimants in the Social
Security system are permitted to hire an attorney to help them at any
point in the process. o3 Hearings before Administrative Law Judges
occur without an adversarial attorney representing Social Security's
interests.40 4 The mere presence of an attorney at the beginning of the
Social Security disability process is not enough to render the process
itself "adversarial." It is important to add here that the "adversarial"
quality that the Supreme Court anticipated in Walters when
evaluating Congress' concern was an environment where the attorney
for a veteran would "cause delay and sow confusion" in order to
zealously represent his or her clients. 40 5 Attorneys involved in the
VA disability process would have a duty to curb this type of behavior
in order to facilitate the non-adversarial, veteran-friendly process to
proceed, just as they do in the Social Security process.
When the Mathews factors are weighed in light of the changes
seen in the last thirty years, it is obvious that the situation today is not
the same as it was when the Walters decision was made. The VA's
system becomes less veteran-friendly and non-adversarial as time
goes on. This should not be the case. Despite Congress' intervention
a number of times, through investigations, hearings, and even
legislation to ensure the VA system is non-adversarial, the system is
continuing to break down. The VA itself seems powerless to fix the
problems. It is time to look at this problem through a new
perspective, scrubbing the dust off of our assumptions about the
VA's system so the light can come in.46 To preserve the due process
rights of our veterans and the veteran-friendly mission of a system
400. See Walters, 473 U.S. at 321-27.
401. See id. at 323-24.
402. See Carpenter, supranote 152, at 288-89.
403. See id at 290. This Article provides for a thorough comparison of attorney representation in
the VA and Social Security Systems.
404. See The Appeals Process, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Mar. 2015), http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-051004 l.pdf.
405. See Walters, 473 U.S. at 324-325.
406. See
Isaac
Asimov,
Quotable
Quote,
GOODREADS,
http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/667214-your-assumptions-are-your-windows-on-the-world-scrubthem (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
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that is going awry, it is time to allow attorneys to help veterans at all
stages in the claims process.
B. Hiringan Attorney: ProvidingDue Processfor the Veteran and
Helping Congress Preserve the VA's Veteran-FriendlyProcess

This Article has illustrated in detail the historical reasoning for
limiting a veteran's Constitutional rights when hiring attorneys in the
initial filing of their claims with the VARO; the importance of the
non-adversarial nature of VA adjudication when determining a
veteran's due process rights; and why the assumption that the VA is
purely non-adversarial is no longer a valid presumption on which to
base this Constitutional limitation. The logical outcome of lifting the
limitation on a veteran's due process rights is to allow veterans to
hire attorneys to file and pursue their claims at all levels of
adjudication, including the initial filing of a claim.
While the benefit of attorneys in the initial stages of the VA's
process is not the scope of this Article, there are many cogent and
compelling reasons to allow attorney intervention that would satisfy
the historical concerns of Congress, protect the VA from frivolous
claims, and ensure a veteran receives due process in the VA disability
system. 4 07 First, attorneys are trained to counsel clients and advise
them of the validity of their claims and the likelihood of the client's
desired outcome. 40 8 Attorneys are under a professional obligation to
refrain from filing frivolous claims with the VA.4 09 If a veteran uses
an attorney to file claims, the likelihood of non-compensable claims
will be lessened.
Second, attorneys have a professional responsibility to be
This
competent in the areas of law in which they practice.
competency requirement is increased beyond state licensing
requirements, because the VA requires attorneys to have annual
accreditation by the VA and take biannual continuing legal education
on veterans benefits. 41 1 This competency means the attorney is
knowledgeable in the process of filing a proper claim on
adjudication, which inures to the client's benefit because they now
407. For more discussion on the benefit of attorneys in the VA process see Allen, supranote 237.
408. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013). Over forty
states have adopted the American Bar Association's Model Rules. See CPR Policy Implementation
Committee, State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct and Comments, AM. BAR.
2011),
23,
1
(May
ASS'N,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/lnigrated/cpr/pic/comments.authcheckdam.pdf
409. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.1.
410. Id. atr. 1.1.
411. 38 C.F.R. § 14.629(b) (2008).
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have a legally trained subject-matter expert on the procedural and
substantive aspects of their claim. One judge at the CAVC has noted
that the VA system has become so complex that adjudicators are
unable to understand the rules.412 Attorneys helping in these
complex cases can only help the process along.
Third, attorneys are expected to represent their clients diligently
and to be skilled in communication. 46 Diligence requires that the
attorney examine and develop documentation in support of the
client's claim. This may mean reviewing stacks of paperwork and
medical records, coordinating private medical examinations,
requesting private medical records, and other work that is standard in
developing any client's case. It also will require an attorney to
remind the VA adjudicators of the complex set of rules which may
apply in the veteran's situation and to make certain the VA is
complying with all of its duties. When the attorney has enough
information to present with the claim, he or she is trained to present
evidence in a manner that is easiest for their audience-in this case
the adjudicator-to understand and act upon.
In these ways, only briefly illustrated above, which are natural to
the representation of any client, attorneys can help to ensure that the
VA's adjudication process maintains the veteran friendly character
that Congress desires, while ensuring that the process affords
veterans the due process to which they are entitled. Not all veterans
may wish to hire an attorney to help them through the claims process.
Indeed, some claims may be simple enough so as not require the help
of an attorney at all and some veterans may not wish to pay for the
services of an attorney. However, veterans' rights to due process
should allow them to make the decision to hire or forgo an attorney's
help for themselves.
VI. CONCLUSION

Veterans' due process rights to hire attorneys in the compensation
process have been limited for centuries because Congress has
presumed and then legislated that the veteran compensation process
be veteran-friendly. While Congress has attempted several times,
and in many ways, over the past thirty years to ensure that veterans'
claims for benefits are adjudicated in a non-adversarial system, the
current state of affairs demonstrates that Congress and the VA alone
are not able to achieve this goal. Congress' desire to keep attorneys
412. See DeLisio v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 45, 63 (Ct. Vet. App. 2011) (Lance, J., concurring).
413. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.3.
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out of the VA process has allowed the VA to erode the veteranfriendly, non-adversarial process at its lowest levels without check.
Most will agree that the VA process should remain as informal and
veteran-friendly as possible in order to fulfill our nation's moral
obligation to our wounded veterans. And, it is easy to understand
how, historically, Congress came to view attorneys helping veterans
with a skeptical eye. However, the current state of affairs at the VA
is not what it was when the Supreme Court found that Congress'
limitation on a veteran's due process was constitutional.
Reexamining Walters's pivotal assumption that the VA is nonadversarial causes a complete reevaluation of the Mathews balancing
test. Particularly when one looks at the possibility that the VA may
erroneously deprive a veteran of benefits and reviews the adequacy
of the safeguards currently in place, it becomes obvious that the
limitation on veterans' rights to hire attorney representation to secure
their benefits is no longer a valid restraint. It appears that the best
way to currently guarantee a veteran-friendly state of affairs at the
VA, particularly when the veteran's claim is complex and requires
legal expertise, is to relieve this limitation on veterans' rights and
allow them to employ attorney representation at every stage of the
process.
General Colin Powell is quoted as saying, "Always focus on the
4 14 In the case of
front windshield and not the rearview mirror.
veterans' benefits, this could not be closer to the truth of how to fix
some of the VA's problems. Limiting veterans' due process rights on
assumptions made about attorneys over a century ago is not working.
It is time to look forward and determine how everyone can work
together for our nation's heroes.

414. Colin Powell, Quotable Quotes, GOODREADS, http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/33951always-focus-on-the-front-windshield-and-not-the-review (last visited Sep. 17, 2016).
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